United States v. Walter Jones
16-3958
| 8th Cir. | Dec 7, 2017Background
- Walter Jones pleaded guilty to being an unlawful drug user in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).
- The PSR applied a 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) based on Jones’s possession of the firearm in connection with a state carrying-weapons offense (Iowa Code § 724.4(1)).
- Jones argued at sentencing and on appeal that the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement (1) impermissibly double counted his conduct and (2) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because controlling circuit precedent (United States v. Walker) post-dated his offense; he also sought a downward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
- The district court applied Walker, imposed the 4-level enhancement, adopted a Guidelines range of 21–27 months, and sentenced Jones to 27 months after considering § 3553(a) factors and distinguishing Jones from his codefendant.
- On appeal the Eighth Circuit reviewed the guideline application de novo (facts for clear error) and reviewed substantive reasonableness under the usual presumption for within-Guidelines sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether applying the 4-level § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement to Jones’s Iowa carrying-weapons offense constitutes impermissible double counting | Jones: Enhancement double counts conduct underlying the § 922(g) offense | Government/District Ct: Iowa § 724.4(1) requires elements distinct from § 922(g); enhancement applies because firearm was used/possessed in connection with another felony | Affirmed — no double counting; enhancement properly applied under circuit precedent (Walker) |
| Whether the enhancement violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because Walker was decided after Jones’s offense | Jones: Retroactive application of Walker increased punishment and thus violates Ex Post Facto | Government/District Ct: Judicial decisions do not trigger the Ex Post Facto Clause | Rejected — Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to judicial decisions |
| Whether Jones’s 27‑month within-Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable | Jones: Sentence is excessive and disparate compared to codefendant’s 16 months | Government/District Ct: Court considered § 3553(a), distinguishing facts, history, fugitive status, and other aggravating factors | Affirmed — sentence not substantively unreasonable; presumption of reasonableness unrebutted |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Walker, 771 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement properly applied to Iowa § 724.4(1) conduct)
- United States v. Peck, 496 F.3d 885 (8th Cir. 2007) (de novo review for double counting issues)
- United States v. Lindquist, 421 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2005) (double-counting concerns explained)
- United States v. Wade, 435 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2006) (Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to judicial decisions)
- Stults v. United States, 575 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2009) (district court must make individualized § 3553(a) assessment; supports reasonableness review)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (standard for reasonableness review of sentences)