United States v. Walker Hampton, 885 F.3d 1016

Hampton robbed a Taylor Ridge post office at gunpoint, taking cash, stamps, and wallets; later arrested after breaking into a trucking business where deputies found three firearms (two stolen) that he was prohibited from possessing.
Deputies informed Hampton they were recording; Hampton said, “Actually, I want to change that. I haven’t even gotten a chance to get a lawyer or anything.” Officers paused, turned off the recorder, discussed whether he had invoked counsel, concluded he had not, read Miranda rights off the record, and Hampton said “Maybe I should have a lawyer.”
The recording resumed, Hampton signed a Miranda waiver, denied the post office robbery at first, then after ~90 minutes confessed.
Indicted on four counts: robbery of federal property (18 U.S.C. § 2114(a)), brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), being a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), and possession of stolen firearms (18 U.S.C. § 922(j)).
Hampton entered a conditional guilty plea reserving appeal on (1) whether § 2114 robbery is a “crime of violence” under § 924(c) and (2) whether his confession should be suppressed as the product of an invocation of the right to counsel.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether robbery of federal property under 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) is a "crime of violence" for § 924(c)	Hampton sought to preserve the question, implying it is not a crime of violence because it can be accomplished by intimidation	Government relied on Seventh Circuit precedent holding § 2114 robbery is a crime of violence	Court affirmed — issue foreclosed by United States v. Enoch; did not overrule precedent
Whether Hampton unequivocally invoked his right to counsel when he said he hadn’t "gotten a chance to get a lawyer" and thus his later confession should be suppressed	Hampton argued the statement clearly invoked the right to counsel and rendered any later waiver involuntary	Government argued the statement was ambiguous (related to recording) and officers reasonably clarified rights and obtained a valid waiver	Court held the statement was ambiguous, not a clear invocation; deputies’ clarification and subsequent Miranda waiver were sufficient, so confession admissible

United States v. Enoch, 865 F.3d 575 (7th Cir. 2017) (held robbery of federal property under § 2114(a) is a crime of violence for § 924(c))
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings about right to remain silent and right to counsel)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (after a clear invocation of counsel, interrogation must cease unless the suspect initiates further communication)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (a suspect must clearly and unambiguously request counsel for interrogation to stop)
United States v. Shabaz, 579 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2009) (application of the clear-invocation rule in this circuit)
United States v. Wysinger, 683 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2012) (consideration of statement plus context when evaluating invocation)
Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216 (7th Cir. 1994) (examples of clear, action-oriented invocations of counsel)
United States v. Lee, 413 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting a potential desire for counsel does not equal an invocation)