965 F.3d 180
2d Cir.2020Background
- On Sept. 2, 2017 in Troy, NY, Sgt. Montanino saw two Black men (Walker and Hopkins) walking in a public, commonly trafficked area and pulled up an email with a photograph labeled “trying to ID suspect #2.” The email did not state any crime.
- Montanino used his phone photo to conclude the men resembled the pictured individual and asked Officers Conway and Furciniti to “stop out” and identify them (a department practice of approaching pedestrians, asking for ID, and running warrant checks).
- The officers approached, asked for identification, showed the photograph, and ran checks; they discovered an outstanding arrest warrant for Walker and placed him in handcuffs. Hopkins was released.
- During a search incident to arrest, officers found marijuana and, after feeling a groin bulge, asked Walker if there was anything else; Walker then admitted possessing ~50 grams of crack cocaine and provided information to police.
- Walker moved to suppress the narcotics and statements as fruits of an unlawful stop; the district court denied suppression. Walker entered a conditional plea and appealed.
- The Second Circuit reversed: officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Walker based on the photo (race and general descriptors were insufficient), and the attenuation doctrine did not rescue the evidence because the stop was purposefully or flagrantly unlawful and any suspicion dissipated before the warrant check.
Issues
| Issue | Walker's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Walker | The email/photo did not show specific, articulable facts of wrongdoing; the photo’s descriptors (race, glasses, facial hair, hair length) were too generic to justify a stop | The photograph showing a possible match and proximity to the shooting supported reasonable suspicion; collective-knowledge imputes Sgt. Montanino’s belief to the stop officers | No. The stop was unconstitutional: race and broad features are too general to generate reasonable suspicion and the email did not indicate criminality |
| Whether evidence and statements should be admissible under the attenuation doctrine despite an unlawful stop | Attenuation does not apply because the stop was executed pursuant to a practice of random “stop-outs,” any suspicion was dispelled when officers approached, and running warrant checks after dissipation was a purposeful fishing expedition | The existence of a valid, preexisting arrest warrant is an intervening circumstance sufficient to attenuate the taint | No. Attenuation fails: short temporal gap, the warrant existed but officers’ conduct was purposeful/flagrant (extremely weak justification and suspicion dissipated), so suppression required |
| Whether Furciniti’s post-arrest question required Miranda warnings | (Argued below) The question was custodial interrogation so statements should be suppressed | The question was non-custodial; Miranda not required | Court did not reach the Miranda issue because it suppressed evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Swindle, 407 F.3d 562 (2d Cir. 2005) (race alone, or with generic traits, does not generate reasonable suspicion)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (constitutional standard for investigatory stops)
- Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2016) (vague suspect descriptions like “thin, black, male” insufficient for a Terry stop)
- Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) (attenuation doctrine factors and when a valid, preexisting warrant may attenuate an unlawful stop)
- Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (exclusionary rule and culpability spectrum for officer misconduct)
- Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (standard for finding clear error in factual findings)
- United States v. Mendez, 885 F.3d 899 (5th Cir. 2018) (contrast: officers’ less-deficient basis for stop and safety concerns can weigh against suppression)