United States v. Waden
699 F. App'x 94
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Defendant Ronald David Waden pleaded guilty to violating supervised release; original conviction was a 2008 sexual offense.
- District court imposed a special condition requiring Waden to undergo “mental health intervention specifically designed for the treatment of sexual offenders as approved by the U.S. Probation Office.”
- Waden challenged that condition on appeal as an unlawful delegation of sentencing authority to the Probation Office.
- The district court and parties clarified at sentencing that the Probation Office would decide whether Waden had engaged in conduct warranting the treatment and then require treatment if it found such conduct.
- The Second Circuit reviewed whether allowing the Probation Office to determine if treatment is required improperly made Waden’s liberty contingent on a probation officer’s discretionary factfinding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the condition delegating approval/requirement of sex-offender treatment to Probation was an unlawful delegation of sentencing authority | Government: condition permitted and within court’s supervision authority | Waden: condition impermissibly delegates judicial sentencing decisions to the Probation Office, making his liberty contingent on a probation officer’s discretion | Vacated and remanded: condition is an improper delegation and must be removed |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001) (court held similar Probation-directed treatment condition impermissible delegation)
- United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015) (probation officers may execute but not impose sentence; liberty cannot be made contingent on officer discretion)
- United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446 (2d Cir. 2002) (discusses limits on probation’s authority to make sentencing determinations)