United States v. Vixamar, 679 F.3d 22

Vixamar and Saintfleur pled guilty in 2009 to two counts each of passport fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1542.
They were placed on probation with conditions addressing conduct, reporting, employment, and, for Vixamar, a healthcare-related restraint due to prior offenses.
The district judge sentenced them to 36 months of probation (with home confinement for Vixamar and Saintfleur) instead of prison, noting substantial concerns about their trustworthiness.
In January 2011, probation-violation charges arose, including deposition of a stolen Gibbs check and failures to disclose work and interactions with authorities.
A magistrate found probable cause on certain charges; a formal revocation and evidentiary hearing was held before the same district judge, who ultimately revoked probation and resentenced both to prison.
The judge resentenced each to 36 months in prison and 36 months of supervised release, justifying the sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and considering prior downward departures in the original sentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was there sufficient evidence to revoke probation for the Gibbs-check theft and inter-association charges?	Vixamar contends evidence is insufficient to prove violations beyond a reasonable doubt.	Saintfleur contends the government did not prove all violations; Vixamar contends the same.	Not clearly erroneous; the district judge did not abuse discretion in finding probation violations.
Are the 36-month prison sentences substantively reasonable under § 3553(a)?	Sentences are above-bounded and overly harsh given the probation violations.	Sentences are within the expansive range of reasonable outcomes given breach of trust and risk to public safety.	Within the realm of reasonable sentencing outcomes; affirmed.
Did the district judge impermissibly double-count breach-of-trust when issuing the sentence?	Sentence improperly layers punishment for the breach of trust and the new offense.	Breaching trust and new offenses are properly weighed; no improper double counting under policy statements.	No plain error; sentence properly focused on breach of trust within permissible discretion.

United States v. DiIanni, 87 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1996) (probation revocation standard: reasonable-satisfaction suffices)
United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1994) (probation revocation burden of proof; reasonable satisfaction standard)
United States v. Czajak, 909 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1990) (probation revocation standard governing burden of proof)
United States v. de Jesús, 277 F.3d 609 (1st Cir. 2002) (uses of original sentence terms in revocation context)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (U.S. 2007) (standard of review for sentencing within/outside Guidelines ranges)
United States v. Rodriguez, 630 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2010) (role of § 3553(a) factors in revocation decisions)
United States v. Vargas-Dávila, 649 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2011) (upward departures and deterrence considerations in revocation)