United States v. Villodas-Rosario, 901 F.3d 10

Villodas‑Rosario pleaded guilty to one count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) pursuant to a plea agreement that: dismissed a separate machine‑gun charge, fixed a 60‑month guideline (statutory minimum), allowed the government to recommend up to 17 years and defense to seek as low as 8 years, and contained an appellate‑waiver if the court sentenced according to the agreement.
At the change‑of‑plea hearing the district court explained rights generally and mentioned that plea agreements sometimes require waivers, but did not specifically detail Villodas‑Rosario’s waiver or probe his understanding of it.
After plea but before sentencing defense counsel raised concerns about the officer’s affidavit; prosecutor agreed to lower the sentencing recommendation to "at least 10 years," later stated as a 120‑month recommendation at sentencing.
At sentencing counsel confirmed the specific appellate‑waiver condition (no appeal if sentenced within 8–17 years) without objection from Villodas‑Rosario; the court sentenced him to 144 months (within the waiver range).
Villodas‑Rosario appealed, arguing the appellate waiver is unenforceable because the colloquy was deficient and misleading (court told him "you can appeal"), and alternatively challenged the sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

Issue	Villodas‑Rosario's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Enforceability of appellate waiver	Waiver unenforceable because district court failed to specifically inquire into and affirm Villodas‑Rosario’s understanding and even misled him by saying he could appeal	Enforce waiver; any colloquy error requires plain‑error showing (Borrero‑Acevedo) and Villodas‑Rosario cannot meet it	Waiver enforced under Teeter: written waiver clear; record shows defendant understood waiver; failure to perfect colloquy does not invalidate waiver
Proper standard for reviewing waiver colloquy	(implicit) Teeter tripartite test should apply to waiver enforcement	Advocates for plain‑error approach per Borrero‑Acevedo (importing Dominguez‑Benitez/Vonn)	Court acknowledges doctrinal tension but applies the more defendant‑friendly Teeter test and still enforces the waiver
Miscarriage‑of‑justice exception to waiver	Denying appeal would be miscarriage because court told him he could appeal and colloquy was misleading	Miscarriage‑of‑justice reserved for egregious errors (race, sentence beyond statutory max, breach of plea terms); routine sentencing claims barred	No miscarriage of justice: claimed procedural and substantive sentencing errors are garden‑variety and barred by waiver
Review of sentence on merits	Requests resentencing for procedural and substantive unreasonableness	Government asks dismissal based on waiver	Merits not reached because waiver enforced; appeal dismissed

United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001) (establishes tripartite test for enforcing appellate waivers and requires a specific colloquy inquiry)
United States v. Borrero‑Acevedo, 533 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2008) (applies plain‑error/Dominguez‑Benitez framework to plea‑colloquy waiver errors)
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) (requires reasonable probability that, but for Rule 11 error, defendant would not have pled guilty)
United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2002) (discusses standard for unpreserved Rule 11 errors)
Sotirion v. United States, 617 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (confirms miscarriage‑of‑justice prong survives Borrero‑Acevedo and is applied sparingly)
United States v. Edelen, 539 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2008) (discusses appellate waiver enforcement principles)
United States v. Madera‑Ortiz, 637 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2011) (addresses substantive reasonableness review of sentencing)
United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993) (earlier precedent adopting requirement that courts inquire into appellate waivers at plea)