United States v. Victor Maldonado, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 13375

Victor Maldonado pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person after police found a handgun, marijuana, and a meth pipe in his vehicle.
The PSR treated two prior convictions (2010 Nebraska attempt to conspire to distribute methamphetamine; 2013 Iowa possession with intent to deliver marijuana) as qualifying "controlled substance offenses," resulting in a base offense level of 24 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2).
The PSR also applied a 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possession of the firearm "in connection with another felony offense," identifying Iowa Code § 724.4(1) (carrying weapons) as that offense.
Maldonado objected to both the controlled-substance classification of his prior convictions and the 4-level § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement; the district court overruled both objections but granted a downward variance treating the enhancement as a 1-level increase for sentencing purposes and sentenced him to 84 months.
On appeal, Maldonado argued the district court procedurally erred by (1) misclassifying his prior convictions as controlled substance offenses and (2) improperly applying the § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Maldonado's Nebraska and Iowa convictions qualify as "controlled substance offenses" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)	Maldonado: statutory terms like "distribute"/"deliver" could encompass a "mere offer to sell," which would fall outside the generic federal definition	Government: Nebraska and Iowa definitions (actual, constructive, or attempted transfer) do not encompass mere offers; no realistic probability states would convict for offers to sell	Court: Affirmed — the convictions categorically fit the generic definition; no showing of realistic probability of nongeneric application
Whether a 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) applies because the firearm was possessed in connection with Iowa carrying-weapons offense	Maldonado: enhancement improper because the state offense is necessarily committed when federal § 922(g) is violated (double-counting/Lindquist concern)	Government: Iowa § 724.4(1) requires distinct elements (e.g., concealed dangerous weapon, carrying within city limits, knowingly transporting in vehicle) so it is not inevitably the same as § 922(g)	Court: Affirmed — enhancement permissible; binding Eighth Circuit precedent (Walker) rejects the Lindquist argument for Iowa § 724.4(1)

Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (explains divisible statutes and the modified categorical approach)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (distinguishes elements from means for applying modified categorical approach)
Fletcher v. United States, 858 F.3d 501 (requires realistic probability, not theoretical possibility, to show a statute covers nongeneric conduct)
Hinkle v. United States, 832 F.3d 569 (example where state statutory definition of "deliver" included "offer to sell," rendering it nongeneric)
Teran-Salas v. United States, 767 F.3d 453 (applies categorical analysis to state possession-with-intent statutes)
United States v. Walker, 771 F.3d 449 (Eighth Circuit: § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement proper when related state carrying-weapons statute has distinct elements)
United States v. Lindquist, 421 F.3d 751 (explains double-counting concern when the "another felony" is necessarily committed to violate the federal offense)
United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 959 (discusses why a mere offer to sell may not fit the federal definition of a controlled-substance offense)