917 F.3d 195
3rd Cir.2019Background
- Williams was charged (information then indictment) with firearms and assault offenses arising from a December 2013 shooting; arraigned on the indictment June 18, 2014.
- District Court ordered competency evaluation and transport to FMC Butner on June 11, 2014; Williams arrived July 29, 2014.
- Court found Williams incompetent on November 5–6, 2014 and committed him under §4241(d); later proceedings led to an evidentiary hearing on involuntary medication in October 2015.
- Government concedes a 53-day non-excludable delay between Oct. 9, 2015 and Dec. 2, 2015; dispute centers on whether the 37 days between June 21 and July 29, 2014 (transport delay) are excludable under the Speedy Trial Act.
- District Court denied Williams’s motions to dismiss (without written analysis) in Oct. 2016; Williams pleaded guilty while reserving speedy-trial appeal, was sentenced to time served; he appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Williams) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §3161(h)(1)(A) excludes all delay for competency proceedings even if transport delay >10 days | All delay from competency proceedings (including transport) is excludable under §3161(h)(1)(A) | §3161(h)(1)(F) limits §3161(h)(1)(A); transport delays >10 days are presumptively unreasonable/non-excludable | Held: §3161(h)(1)(F) limits §3161(h)(1)(A); transport delay beyond 10 days is presumptively non-excludable unless rebutted |
| Whether the 37-day transport delay (June 21–July 29, 2014) was excludable | Delay was part of competency proceedings and thus excludable | Delay was presumptively unreasonable under §3161(h)(1)(F); gov’t did not rebut presumption | Held: 37-day delay is non-excludable; gov’t failed to rebut presumption |
| Whether total non-excludable time exceeded 70 days under §3161(c)(1) | Contended exclusions make total <=70 days | Conceded 53-day period; argued transport delay excludable so total within 70 days | Held: Total non-excludable time = 90 days (53 + 37) → violation of Speedy Trial Act |
| Remedy: dismissal with or without prejudice under §3162(a)(2) | Dismiss with prejudice because defendant already served full sentence/time served | District court should decide prejudice; remediation possibly without prejudice | Held: Dismissal with prejudice ordered because Williams has served full sentence and retrial would serve no purpose |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Graves, 722 F.3d 544 (3d Cir.) (defines when §3161(h)(1)(A) excludable period begins)
- United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329 (2d Cir.) (held all competency-related delay excludable under §3161(h)(1)(A))
- United States v. Tinklenberg, 579 F.3d 589 (6th Cir.) (held transport delays beyond 10 days presumptively unreasonable/non-excludable under §3161(h)(1)(F))
- Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986) (instructs reading §3161(h) subsections "in connection with" each other)
- Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (district court decides dismissal with or without prejudice in first instance)
- TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (statutory interpretation principle avoiding superfluous language)
- United States v. Carrasquillo, 667 F.2d 382 (3d Cir.) (dismissal for Speedy Trial Act violation is mandatory)
