United States v. Velez-Andino, 12 F.4th 105

Background

Vélez-Andino had multiple prior convictions, including three federal felonies (a 2004 Florida drug conviction and two 2012 federal firearms convictions); he began supervised release in August 2017.
Less than three months into supervised release, ATF officers arrested him after a chase and found a .40 Glock in his fanny pack loaded, fitted with an automatic conversion "chip," plus extra magazines; a two‑count federal indictment followed (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 922(o)).
He pleaded guilty to the new firearms charges; the PSR (with some objections sustained) yielded a total offense level 17, CHC IV, and a Guidelines range of 37–46 months.
The district court imposed an upwardly variant concurrent 60‑month sentence on the new charges after considering 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the defendant’s long criminal history; defense urged duress/self‑defense down‑departure, government sought 60 months.
Two weeks later a separate judge revoked his supervised release, found a Grade A violation, calculated an advisory revocation range of 24–30 months (max statutory 24 months) and imposed a consecutive 24‑month revocation sentence.
On appeal Vélez-Andino argued procedural errors (reliance on dismissed arrests, failure to address duress, inadequate 3553(a)/3583(e) articulation) and substantive unreasonableness of both sentences.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court impermissibly relied on dismissed arrests/overstated record at sentencing	Court referenced arrests and prior charges that were dismissed or not counted; reliance inflated perceived criminality	Court merely recited undisputed PSR facts and relied on actual convictions and pending revocation; comments about arrests were not used to calculate CHC	No procedural error; either harmless or not relied upon; plain‑error review fails because no substantial‑rights prejudice
Whether the court ignored or failed to address duress/self‑defense and thus should have departed downward under USSG §5K2.12	Vélez claimed he carried the gun out of fear for his life and urged duress departure	Court heard and considered the duress argument but was not required to adopt it or explain rejection in detail; downward departure is discretionary	No abuse of discretion; no duty to explicitly reject every argument and absence of extraordinary circumstances defeats appeal
Whether the sentencing and revocation courts failed to articulate adequate 3553(a)/3583(e) reasoning (plain‑error claim)	Sentencing explanations were terse and failed to analyze totality of circumstances	Courts expressly stated they considered the statutory factors, discussed key factors, and identified principal factors relied upon	No plain error; statutory requirement satisfied by explicit statements and discussion of salient factors
Whether the 60‑month upward variance and the consecutive 24‑month revocation sentence were substantively unreasonable	Sentences were greater than advisory ranges and excessive given claimed mitigating context	Sentences reflected defendant’s recidivism, firearms history, possession of a machine‑gun device, breach of supervised release, and deterrence/public‑protection goals	Sentences are substantively reasonable and within the broad universe of outcomes; district courts’ plausible rationales justified both sentences

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Matos-de-Jesús, 856 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 2017) (two‑step procedural then substantive sentencing review)
United States v. Díaz-Lugo, 963 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2020) (limits on relying on arrests and standards for abuse of discretion)
United States v. Rivera-Morales, 961 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020) (deference to district court sentencing determinations)
United States v. Miranda-Díaz, 942 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2019) (district court may rely on undisputed PSR conduct from dismissed charges)
United States v. Rodríguez-Meléndez, 828 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2016) (sentencing court may not rest on demonstrably false facts)
United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588 (1st Cir. 2011) (no single reasonable sentence; assess whether result falls within universe of reasonable outcomes)
United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2013) (size of variance alone does not render a sentence unreasonable)
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (district courts have discretion to vary from Guidelines)