United States v. Velázquez, 777 F.3d 91

José L. Velázquez was previously convicted in Maine of two counts of gross sexual assault of a child under 14 (Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17‑A, § 253(1)(B)) and received state prison time and lifetime sex‑offender registration.
After release he violated registration/probation, absconded, and was later indicted federally under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 for failure to register as a sex offender following interstate travel; he pleaded guilty with a stipulated offense level of 13.
The PSI treated the two state convictions as one prior sentence (three criminal‑history points); the government sought an additional point under USSG § 4A1.1(e)/§ 4B1.2, arguing Maine § 253(1)(B) is a "crime of violence."
The district court found United States v. Eirby controlling, assessed the additional point, placed Velázquez in Criminal History Category V, and sentenced him to 37 months (top of guidelines range).
On appeal Velázquez argued (invoking Begay v. United States) that strict‑liability sexual offenses cannot qualify under the career‑offender residual clause because they need not be "purposeful, violent, and aggressive;" the First Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Maine gross sexual assault of a minor (Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17‑A, § 253(1)(B)) is a "crime of violence" under USSG § 4B1.2(a) (residual clause) for criminal‑history scoring	Government: the offense typically presents a serious potential risk of physical injury and thus qualifies as a crime of violence	Velázquez: Begay requires predicate crimes to be "purposeful, violent, and aggressive;" strict‑liability sex offenses lack that quality and therefore do not qualify	The First Circuit affirmed: the offense is categorically a crime of violence; Begay's language is a guide, not a categorical bar to strict‑liability child‑sex offenses

United States v. Eirby, 515 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2008) (held statutory sexual act with 14–15‑year‑old by adult 10+ years older is a crime of violence)
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (ACCA residual‑clause analysis; emphasized crimes "purposeful, violent, and aggressive")
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (articulated categorical approach for prior offenses)
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (clarified similarity‑of‑risk test for residual clause)
United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008) (post‑Begay decision equating "crime of violence" analysis and upholding certain sex‑trafficking predicate as crime of violence)