United States v. Vazquez
724 F.3d 15
| 1st Cir. | 2013Background
- In Dec. 2007–Jan. 2008 the FBI used a confidential informant to make controlled buys of crack cocaine from Kathy Vázquez and her boyfriend, Bernado "Junito" Soto; one buy occurred at Vázquez's home.
- After Soto was arrested on a parole violation, FBI agents met Vázquez at a Dunkin' Donuts, told her New Hampshire Probation & Parole could and would search her home without consent, and obtained her signed consent to a search.
- A joint search by FBI and probation/parole yielded powder cocaine, drug paraphernalia, cash, a Western Union receipt, scales and cutting agents; Vázquez was indicted on four counts and convicted on three (conspiracy, distribution Dec. 6, and possession w/ intent Jan. 16), acquitted on distribution Dec. 5.
- At sentencing the court attributed ~100 grams of crack and applied a two-level firearm enhancement, producing a Guidelines range and a 78-month sentence.
- Vázquez appealed, arguing (1) consent was invalid because obtained by a (false) claim that a warrantless search would occur anyway, (2) the court should have instructed the jury on duress, and (3) sentencing errors (drug-quantity attribution and firearm finding).
- The First Circuit affirmed convictions on the conspiracy and Dec. 6 distribution counts, vacated the Jan. 16 possession conviction and remanded to determine whether it was reasonable for officers to believe probation/parole lawfully could search without consent; it upheld denial of duress instruction and the Guidelines calculations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of consent to search when procured by claim that another agency would search anyway | Vázquez: consent was vitiated because agents told her probation/parole would search without consent (a false or legally unsupported claim) | Government: agents honestly relayed that state officers believed they had authority; subjective good faith justified admission; or alternatively probation/parole had independent authority | Court: consent is valid only if officers' claim of inevitability was based on an objectively reasonable assessment of facts/law; subjective good faith alone insufficient; remand for district court to decide reasonableness of belief that probation/parole could search |
| Independent authority of Probation & Parole to search without consent | Vázquez: probation/parole lacked authority (so FBI's claim was false) | Government: Vázquez did not meaningfully challenge state authority; or even if challenged, state officers may have authority based on parole condition or reasonable suspicion | Court: Vázquez did challenge it; record lacks necessary factual findings (residency, parole terms, knowledge) so district court must determine on remand whether state had authority; if yes, search lawful regardless of consent; if not, evidence may be suppressed |
| Duress jury instruction | Vázquez: she participated only from fear of Ñetas gang and gun-related threats; testimony and background justified instruction | Government: threats were vague, not imminent, and no evidence of lack of safe alternatives; not sufficiently objective | Court: no reasonable view of the evidence supported duress (threats were speculative, not imminent, and no reasonable legal alternative shown); refusal to instruct was correct |
| Sentencing: drug-quantity and firearm enhancement | Vázquez: district court overstated quantity (attributed ~100g) and improperly counted Soto's October gun possession as relevant conduct | Government: evidence (conversations, cash, informant testimony) supported quantity and foreseeability of co-conspirator's gun; Guidelines permit relevant-conduct attribution | Court: district court did not clearly err in attributing 100g or in applying firearm enhancement as reasonably foreseeable and part of same course of conduct; sentencing calculations upheld (unless remand requires resentencing if Count IV reversed) |
Key Cases Cited
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (officer's knowingly false assertion that warrant existed vitiates consent)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (consent must be voluntary under totality of circumstances)
- Illinois v. Rodríguez, 497 U.S. 177 (consent valid if officers reasonably, though mistakenly, believe consenting party has authority)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (limits on home entry incident to arrest; arrest warrant does not authorize later home search)
- Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (reasonableness standard for officers' factual mistakes)
- Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (Fourth Amendment reasonableness requires objective evaluation of police conduct)
- United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (parole condition can diminish expectation of privacy; reasonable suspicion may justify warrantless search of probationer)