United States v. Vargas, 35 F.4th 936

Andres Vargas pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute ≥500 grams of cocaine; he was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment and 4 years’ supervised release.
The probation officer classified Vargas as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on the instant offense and two prior felony drug convictions (possession with intent to distribute amphetamine; conspiracy to manufacture/distribute methamphetamine).
Vargas objected that inchoate offenses (e.g., conspiracy) do not qualify as "controlled substance offenses" under § 4B1.2(b) and argued the Guidelines commentary extending the definition to inchoate offenses was not entitled to deference after Kisor v. Wilkie.
The district court overruled the objection; Vargas appealed, preserving the issue for de novo review.
The Fifth Circuit relied on controlling circuit precedent (notably United States v. Lightbourn) holding that the Sentencing Commission’s commentary includes inchoate offenses and concluded Kisor did not unequivocally undermine Stinson deference as applied in this circuit.
The court affirmed the district court’s judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether conspiracy/other inchoate offenses qualify as "controlled substance offenses" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) for career-offender status	United States: § 4B1.2 and its commentary include inchoate offenses, so Vargas is a career offender	Vargas: Plain text of the Guidelines does not cover inchoate offenses; commentary cannot expand definition	Court: Affirmed that inchoate offenses count under § 4B1.2 as interpreted in Lightbourn; career-offender designation stands
Whether Kisor v. Wilkie eliminated or undermined Stinson deference to Sentencing Guidelines commentary	United States: Kisor did not unequivocally overrule Stinson or Fifth Circuit precedent; commentary remains authoritative here	Vargas: Kisor narrowed Auer-style deference and thus the § 4B1.2 commentary is not binding	Court: Kisor did not unequivocally override circuit precedent; panels continue to apply Stinson to Guidelines commentary; therefore the commentary remains controlling

United States v. Lightbourn, 115 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1997) (held § 4B1.2 commentary lawfully includes inchoate drug offenses)
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993) (Sentencing Guidelines commentary is authoritative unless unconstitutional, statutorily prohibited, plainly erroneous, or inconsistent)
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (refined Auer deference; requires a genuinely ambiguous rule and exhaustion of traditional tools before deferring)
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (agency deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation)
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945) (early formulation of deference to administrative interpretations)
United States v. Petras, 879 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2018) (discusses rule of orderliness; a Supreme Court decision must unequivocally overrule precedent to displace circuit law)
United States v. Kendrick, 980 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2020) (applies Lightbourn and clarifies reliance on § 4B1.2 commentary)