United States v. Vanhook
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7884
| 6th Cir. | 2011Background
- Vanhook pled guilty to felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
- PSR classified him as an armed career criminal based on three prior felonies, including two cocaine sales (Jan 1990) and a July 1998 burglary facilitation conviction.
- District court overruled objections and held Vanhook an armed career criminal, sentencing him to 180 months.
- A panel previously held facilitation of burglary to be a violent felony under ACCA, but that decision was vacated following Begay and Chambers.
- Supreme Court decisions Begay and Chambers led to remand for re-sentencing in accordance with Begay/Chambers standards.
- On remand, the district court again found facilitation of the burglary a violent felony; Vanhook appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does facilitation of burglary of a building qualify as a violent felony under ACCA | Vanhook argues it does not fit ACCA’s violent felony categories. | The government contends it falls within the ACCA’s otherwise clause as a serious risk of harm and is similar to enumerated offenses. | Not a violent felony under §924(e)(2)(B)(ii); vacate and remand. |
| Applicability of the serious risk of physical injury prong post-Begay | Facilitation of burglary poses a serious risk of violence. | Begay requires more than risk; must be purposeful, violent, and aggressive in kind. | The offense satisfies serious risk prong; but merits further analysis under the similarity prong, leading to remand. |
| Sufficiency of similarity in kind under Begay's purposeful, violent, and aggressive standard | Facilitation of burglary is similar in kind to listed offenses and thus violent. | Facilitation involves no intent to commit the felony; not sufficiently purposeful. | Not sufficiently purposeful, violent, and aggressive; not a violent felony under the otherwise clause. |
| Impact of knowing/knowing-with-intent conduct on Begay framework | Knowing conduct (facilitation) should be treated as purposeful. | Knowing conduct does not automatically satisfy Begay’s purposeful requirement when intent to commit the felony is absent. | Facilitation of burglary involves no intent to burglary; not sufficient to qualify under the otherwise clause. |
| Consistency with Begay and other circuits on 'knowing' or 'intentional' statutes | Other courts have treated some knowing offenses as violent felonies. | Those decisions are distinguishable; facilitation is unlike the enumerated offenses. | Distinguishable; facilitation does not meet Begay's criteria. |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court 2008) (requires 'purposeful, violent, and aggressive' conduct for the otherwise clause)
- Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (Supreme Court 2009) (modifies framework for violent felonies under ACCA)
- Sawyers, 409 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.2005) (precedent on categorical approach to violent felonies)
- Foreman, 436 F.3d 638 (6th Cir.2006) (permissible use of charging documents and plea materials to establish nature of prior offense)
- Bartee, 529 F.3d 357 (6th Cir.2008) (categorical approach avoids relitigating facts of prior convictions)
- United States v. Crews, 621 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.2010) (knowing conduct often implies intentional action, but not always sufficient for Begay)
- United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344 (6th Cir.2010) (discussion of serious risk of violence in Begay-era context)