United States v. Vanderwerff, 788 F.3d 1266

Background

Timothy Vanderwerff was indicted on three child-pornography counts; he and the government first negotiated a plea: guilty to Count 2 (possession), dismissal of Counts 1 and 3, and an appellate-waiver provision in the plea agreement.
At the initial change-of-plea hearing the district court declined to accept the plea and ordered supplemental briefing after raising concerns about appellate waivers in light of Lafler and post-Booker sentencing discretion.
The district court ultimately rejected the entire plea agreement because it found the appellate waiver "unjustified," characterizing § 3553(a) factors as “exclusive” and relevant to assessing waivers.
The parties then negotiated a new plea without an appellate waiver that exposed Vanderwerff to a higher statutory range (receipt count with a five-year mandatory minimum); the court accepted the new plea and later sentenced him to 108 months.
On appeal Vanderwerff, the government, and appointed amicus agreed the district court erred in rejecting the first plea; the Tenth Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and reversed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court abused its discretion by rejecting a plea agreement because it included an appellate waiver	Vanderwerff: court’s rejection rested on mistaken legal premises (misreading Lafler, Booker, and misapplying § 3553) so the rejection was an abuse of discretion	Government: agrees with Vanderwerff that the court erred and joins request for reversal; amicus concurs	Reversed: district court abused its discretion; vacate judgment, allow plea withdrawal, and remand for further proceedings
Whether Lafler justifies heightened judicial scrutiny or participation in plea bargaining	Vanderwerff: Lafler does not alter trial-court role in plea bargaining; it addresses ineffective assistance only	Court below: read Lafler as elevating plea-bargaining constitutional scrutiny and justifying active judicial role	Rejected: Lafler concerns ineffective-assistance standards, not a new role for judges in plea negotiations
Whether Booker undermines enforceability of appellate waivers or requires courts to limit them because of broader sentencing discretion	Vanderwerff/Gov: Booker does not invalidate waivers or require trial courts to restrict them	Court below: thought Booker’s advisory Guidelines and abuse-of-discretion review meant waivers could improperly insulate discretionary sentencing from appeal	Rejected: Booker does not bar or require narrow approval of appellate waivers; multiple circuits (and Tenth Circuit precedent) enforce waivers post-Booker
Whether § 3553(a) factors are the proper basis to approve or reject an appellate waiver	Vanderwerff: § 3553(a) governs sentencing, not the validity of waivers; importing it into plea-acceptance is legal error	Court below: used § 3553(a) as an "exclusive" lens to assess whether a waiver was justified	Rejected: § 3553(a) applies to sentencing, not to whether a court may accept a plea provision like an appellate waiver; using it was irrelevant legal error

Key Cases Cited

Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (applied Strickland to ineffective-assistance claims arising from plea-bargaining)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (held Sentencing Guidelines are advisory)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing charge bargains and sentencing discretion)
United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2001) (public policy supports plea agreements with appellate waivers)
United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2011) (post-Booker appellate waivers not prohibited)
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (recognizing the central role of guilty pleas)
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (plea bargains are an essential component of administration of justice)