United States v. Vandale Thomas
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1668
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Defendant Vandale Thomas was Traffic Court CFO for New Orleans; charged with theft from a program receiving federal funds (18 U.S.C. § 666), money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1957), and payment structuring (31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)) after overbilling and issuing checks to himself.
- Jury convicted Thomas (three § 666 counts, three § 1957 counts, five § 5324 counts); district court sentenced him to three years imprisonment.
- Government’s theory: the Traffic Court is a department of the City, Thomas was an agent of the City authorized to act with respect to City funds, and he misappropriated funds (2008–2011) including transfers among multiple court accounts.
- Key factual support: testimony that Traffic Court is a City department, Court received annual City appropriations, Thomas prepared budgets, managed multiple accounts (some holding City funds), authorized to move funds and generate checks, and the City audited/oversaw Court finances.
- Thomas’s defenses: insufficient nexus/agency to apply § 666 (arguing funds were Traffic Court/JEF funds), constitutional overbreadth if § 666 applied, challenges to expert testimony, Rule 404(b) evidence, and a Batson/reverse-Batson juror-selection dispute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Thomas) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that Thomas was an “agent” under § 666 | Evidence showed Traffic Court is a City department; Thomas had authority over City funds and accounts; jury properly instructed | Thomas lacked authority over City funds (paid from Court JEF); insufficient nexus to City to trigger § 666 | Affirmed — evidence sufficient when viewed for government; jury properly instructed and Phillips/Sabri framework satisfied |
| Constitutionality of applying § 666 to Thomas’s conduct | Application is constitutional where there is nexus between misconduct and agency receiving federal funds | Overbroad application of § 666 would be unconstitutional if no agency nexus | Rejected Thomas’s claim — because evidence established agency nexus, statute’s application here is constitutional |
| Admission of government expert (Duplessis) testimony | Expert testimony on laundering/structuring, charts, and analysis aided jury | Testimony improperly addressed defendant’s state of mind, vouched for charts, and opined on the law | No plain error — testimony admissible; did not improperly decide ultimate mens rea; any legal content was accurate and jury instructed to view expert like any other witness |
| Admission of prior act evidence under Rule 404(b) | Prior inflated/duplicate invoices showed intent and absence of mistake | Prior acts were uncharged and prejudicial | No abuse of discretion — evidence probative of intent, closely related in time, and jury properly instructed |
| Reverse-Batson challenge (empaneling juror struck by defense) | Government objected to defense strike as racially motivated; trial court found defense reasons pretextual | Thomas argued court clearly erred in finding pretext | No clear error — district court credited demeanor and found proffered reasons not credible; appellate court defers to trial court credibility finding |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2000) (defines § 666 “agent” inquiry and limits scope by requiring authority to act regarding the entity’s funds)
- Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) (emphasizes nexus to the government entity receiving federal funds, not to particular federal funds)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- United States v. Cooper, 714 F.3d 873 (5th Cir. 2013) (applies Jackson standard)
- United States v. Benitez, 809 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2015) (plain-error framework for reviewing unpreserved evidentiary objections)
- United States v. Dvorin, 817 F.3d 438 (5th Cir. 2016) (permitting expert language that uses terms like “fraud” when it does not directly state defendant’s mental state)
- Snap-Drape, Inc. v. C.I.R., 98 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1996) (expert witness may not render conclusions of law)