724 F.3d 15
1st Cir.2013Background
- Vázquez sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant; powder cocaine and cash were found in her home after a related search.
- A Dunkin’ Donuts interview led to consent for a home search; FBI claimed a warrantless search would occur without consent.
- Evidence from the home search contributed to Counts I (conspiracy), III (distribution), and IV (possession with intent) of the indictment; Count II (distribution) was acquitted.
- District court denied suppression; Vázquez was convicted on Counts I, III, and IV and sentenced under the Guidelines to 78 months.
- On appeal, the district court’s suppression ruling and two sentencing issues are challenged: the validity of consent, whether duress instructions were required, and the proper drug quantity/gun enhancement for Guideline calculation.
- The majority remands on suppression to determine if the anticipated nonconsensual search authority was reasonable; duress instruction denied; Guideline calculation affirmed contingent on remand outcomes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consent obtained via misrepresentation about a warrantless search | Vázquez argues the FBI’s claim was false and coercive. | Vázquez challenges the adequacy of the district court’s factual finding; the agents acted in good faith. | Remand for factual determination; consent may be invalid if the authority claim was unreasonable. |
| Duress instruction should have been given | Vázquez contends duress defense supported by Soto’s gang associations. | No immediate threat; no well-grounded fear; no legal basis for duress instruction. | No error; no substantial evidence of immediate threat supporting duress. |
| Calculation of Guidelines sentencing (drug quantity and gun enhancement) | Vázquez challenges 100 g crack attribution and gun enhancement. | District court properly attributed uncharged quantities and found weapon possession in cognizable scope. | Guideline calculations affirmed; remand may alter if Counts I or IV are reversed on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) (false assurances taint consent to search)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent must be voluntary under totality of circumstances)
- Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (reasonable, not necessarily correct, belief of authority governs consent)
- United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978) (validity of consent under mistaken but reasonable assurances)
- United States v. Twomey, 884 F.2d 46 (1st Cir. 1989) (consideration of coercive or deceptive tactics in obtaining consent)
- United States v. Vanvliet, 542 F.3d 259 (1st Cir. 2008) (coercion and voluntariness in consent to search; totality of circumstances)