78 F.4th 1355
11th Cir.2023Background
- Wiley was tried for conspiracy and five counts of aiding-and-abetting Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951 and § 2) and five § 924(c) counts for using/carrying/brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence.
- During voir dire, Prospective Juror 23 (a Jehovah’s Witness) said her beliefs made it difficult to judge others, she lacked faith in the justice system, and she could not say she could be impartial; the court struck her for cause.
- The government introduced surveillance video/stills from the codefendant Starling’s house; two officers who became familiar with Wiley after his arrest identified Wiley in the images; defense did not object to that testimony and defense counsel acknowledged the person in the video was Wiley.
- Starling (codefendant) personally identified Wiley in the surveillance footage and testified Wiley committed robberies, that Wiley used masks and a gun, and that Wiley paid him for driving; forensic evidence (fingerprints/DNA) tied Wiley to masks and the gun.
- Jury convicted Wiley on all counts; he moved under Rule 29 to dismiss three § 924(c) counts arguing aiding-and-abetting Hobbs Act robbery is not a "crime of violence"; the district court denied the motion and Wiley appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wiley) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether striking Juror 23 for cause was an abuse of discretion | Juror 23 only said it would be difficult to judge others and expressed skepticism of the system, not that she could not follow law or be fair | Her statements showed she could not confirm impartiality or follow jury instructions; removal permitted when juror says she cannot sit in judgment due to beliefs | No abuse of discretion; strike permissible because juror could not assure fairness |
| Whether admitting law-enforcement lay ID testimony from officers who first knew Wiley post-arrest was plain error | Officers lacked sufficient familiarity to give helpful lay-identification opinions; testimony should have been excluded | Officers had more familiarity than jurors (they were present at arrest); even assuming error, defense cannot show substantial-rights prejudice given other ID evidence | No reversible plain error because substantial evidence (Starling ID, defense concession, fingerprints/DNA) cured any error |
| Whether aiding-and-abetting Hobbs Act robbery is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) | Taylor undermines precedent; attempted Hobbs Act is not a crime of violence, so accessory liability should not qualify | Aiding-and-abetting under § 2 is not an inchoate attempt; it makes the aider a principal and thus carries all elements of completed Hobbs Act robbery, which is a crime of violence under Eleventh Circuit precedent | Rejected; Eleventh Circuit precedent controls: aiding-and-abetting completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under § 924(c) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Brown, 996 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (juror removal doctrine where religious beliefs impede judging others)
- United States v. Lewis, 40 F.4th 1229 (11th Cir. 2022) (affirming strike of juror who could not confirm impartiality)
- United States v. Pierce, 136 F.3d 770 (11th Cir. 1998) (standards for admitting lay opinion identification testimony)
- United States v. Campo, 840 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2016) (plain-error review for unpreserved evidentiary objections)
- In re Colon, 826 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding aiding-and-abetting Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence)
- In re Saint Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2016) (completed Hobbs Act robbery satisfies § 924(c)(3)(A) elements clause)
- United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022) (Supreme Court: attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence)
- United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2009) (standard for when a Supreme Court decision abrogates prior panel precedent)
- United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2015) (aiding-and-abetting under § 2 is alternative route to principal liability)
- United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2006) (plain-error substantial-rights standard)