United States v. Tyson Keepseagle, 30 F.4th 802

Defendant Tyson Keepseagle lived with his stepchildren in Bullhead, South Dakota; four children were the subjects of a federal indictment for child abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (state law SDCL § 26-10-1 applied).
On or about Aug. 10, 2018 (and a charged June–Aug. 2018 window), witnesses described multiple incidents: Quil t testified he saw Keepseagle punch AR.Q. and throw AR.Q. and AY.Q. off a porch; other children (D.Q., R.Q.J., B.Q., S.Q.) described separate incidents (punches to chest/stomach, hair-pulling).
Grand jury indicted four counts (one per child). At trial the jury convicted on Counts I (AR.Q.), III (S.Q.), and IV (R.Q.J.) and acquitted on Count II (AY.Q.).
Defense sought a continuance on the eve of trial based on late disclosures that Quil t may have coerced or bribed children; the district court denied the continuance and trial proceeded.
On appeal Keepseagle argued (1) the court plainly erred by not giving a special unanimity instruction on Count I because the government presented multiple discrete acts as one count, (2) insufficient evidence supported the convictions, and (3) the court abused its discretion in denying the continuance. The court vacated Count I (unanimity error), affirmed Counts III and IV and the denial of continuance, and remanded Count I for a new trial.

Issue	Keepseagle's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Special unanimity instruction for Count I (AR.Q.)	Multiple discrete acts (porch-throw, punch to chest, punch to stomach) were presented on one count; absence of a special unanimity instruction left no assurance jury unanimously agreed on a single act.	Evidence showed a continuous course of conduct; general unanimity instruction sufficed.	Court applied plain-error review and held the district court plainly erred by not giving a special unanimity instruction; vacated Count I and remanded for new trial.
Sufficiency of the evidence (Counts III and IV)	Trial evidence was insufficient and witness credibility was undermined by recantations/claims of coercion.	Credibility determinations are for the jury; testimony provided sufficient evidence of abuse.	Affirmed convictions on Counts III (S.Q.) and IV (R.Q.J.); reasonable jury could credit testimony and find elements satisfied.
Denial of continuance	Last-minute disclosures about Quil t’s alleged coercion required time to investigate and prepare cross-examination; denial prejudiced defense.	Defense had over a year to prepare; counsel was prepared and cross-examined witnesses; defendant failed to identify what additional admissible evidence a delay would yield.	Denial of continuance was not an abuse of discretion; conviction proceedings unaffected.

State v. White Face, 857 N.W.2d 387 (S.D. 2014) (special unanimity instruction required where evidence shows discrete alternative acts and jury may divide)
United States v. Iron Hawk, 612 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2010) (elements of felony child abuse under § 26-10-1 applied in Indian Country prosecution)
United States v. Carnes, 22 F.4th 743 (8th Cir. 2022) (plain-error standard articulated for unpreserved jury-instruction claims)
United States v. Woolsey, 759 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2014) (plain-error review framework)
United States v. Never Misses A Shot, 781 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2015) (appellate deference to jury credibility findings)
United States v. Vesey, 330 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2003) (abuse-of-discretion standard for continuance denials)
State v. Morgan, 824 N.W.2d 98 (S.D. 2012) (distinguishing permissible discipline from abuse based on injuries)