United States v. Tyrone Williams
664 F. App'x 316
| 4th Cir. | 2016Background
- Tyrone Maurice Williams pled guilty to: Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951), a § 924(c) gun offense, felon-in-possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), and credit-union robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) based on two armed robberies (Dollar General and First Flight FCU) and a separate gun-recovery incident.
- At the Dollar General robbery (July 2012) Williams shot two employees, forced a cashier to open the safe, and fled with $600; at the credit union (Feb 2014) he obtained $4,373 by passing a threatening note.
- The PSR grouped Counts 1, 3, and 4; the combined adjusted offense level produced a Guidelines range of 110–137 months; Count 2 (§ 924(c)) required a consecutive mandatory minimum 10 years. Neither party objected to the PSR.
- On Jan 21, 2015 the district court imposed a total sentence of 480 months (concurrent statutory maximums on Counts 1 and 4, consecutive statutory maximum on Count 3, plus mandatory 120 months on Count 2).
- Six days later the district court sua sponte reopened sentencing and, believing it had miscalculated and after "reflection," reduced Williams’ sentence to 360 months; both parties agreed the court had power to do so.
- On appeal the Fourth Circuit: (1) affirmed convictions (Hobbs Act Commerce Clause challenge foreclosed by precedent); (2) held the district court lacked jurisdiction to resentence under Rule 35(a) so the original 480-month sentence is the operative judgment; (3) vacated the 480-month sentence as substantively unreasonable and remanded for resentencing before a different judge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Williams) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of the Hobbs Act under Commerce Clause | Hobbs Act is unconstitutional as beyond Commerce Clause power | Precedent upholding Hobbs Act controls | Rejected; claim foreclosed by precedent (affirm conviction) |
| District court’s power to modify sentence six days later under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a) | Reopening/sentence correction was permissible within 14 days as court "corrected" sentence | Court may only correct clear arithmetical/technical errors; not change mind | District court lacked jurisdiction to modify sentence under Rule 35(a); 360-month resentencing was void; 480-month sentence is operative for review |
| Substantive reasonableness of the 480-month sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) | Sentence justified by seriousness, victims’ impact, deterrence, and need to protect public; upward variance warranted | Sentence reasonable given facts and victim harm | Vacated: 480-month sentence substantively unreasonable due to excessive variance, emotional/other improper influences, and inadequate justification; remand for resentencing |
| Need for a different judge on remand | (Implied) original judge may resentencing anew | Government did not appeal; court urged new judge due to prior proceedings | Remanded for resentencing before a different district judge |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2003) (Hobbs Act Commerce Clause precedent)
- United States v. Layman, 116 F.3d 105 (4th Cir. 1997) (Rule 35(a) limitations; sentencing announcement rule)
- United States v. Fields, 552 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2009) (finality and narrow scope of Rule 35(a))
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (procedures and standards for sentencing review; need to explain variances)
- United States v. Washington, 743 F.3d 938 (4th Cir. 2014) (review of reasonableness for upward variances)