United States v. Tynisha Hornbuckle
784 F.3d 549
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Tynisha and Tamrell Hornbuckle ran a prostitution ring from 2008 to 2011 with help from siblings and their mother, exploiting three homeless minors as victims.
- Three underage victims—P.H. (13), A.Hi. (15–16), and A.He. (17)— were controlled with daily quotas, abuse, and coercive tactics to procure sex acts.
- Victims provided earnings to the Hornbuckles; the sisters managed minors while also handling some adult clients, with violence used to enforce compliance.
- Law enforcement investigation began after a confidential FBI source flagged the minors’ prostitution; undercover arrests followed for P.H. and A.Hi.
- In July 2011, the sisters were indicted; they pled guilty to two counts concerning sex trafficking of A.He. and A.Hi., with other charges dropped.
- The district court imposed sentences of 188 months (Tynisha) and 151 months (Tamrell), applying two U.S.S.G. enhancements: undue influence (b(2)(B)) and actual sex acts (b(4)(A)).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §2G1.3(b)(4)(A) is impermissible double counting | Hornbuckles contend it counts an element of §1591. | Government argues the enhancement is not double counting because sex act is not an element of §1591. | Not double counting; proper use under either standard. |
| Whether the district court properly applied §2G1.3(b)(2)(B) for undue influence | Undue influence is not shown for all three victims. | Record shows coercive control over all three victims. | Properly applied to all three victims; substantial evidence supports undue influence. |
| Whether minor victims’ willingness precludes undue influence | Victims’ prior willingness negates undue influence. | Willingness does not defeat the fact of undue influence under the evidence. | Evidence of willingness does not compel reversal; undue influence supported. |
| What standard of review applies and its effect on the outcome | Argument on standard of review may affect deference to findings. | Standard of review does not change outcome here. | Either de novo or abuse of discretion yields same result; sentences affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2010) (1591 conviction does not require actual sex act to be proved for the enhancement)
- United States v. Willoughby, 742 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2014) (victim’s future coercion standard supports undue influence without certainty of acts)
- United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 2013) (courts inconsistently interpret ‘will be caused’ in §1591)
- United States v. Anderson, 560 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2009) (undue influence not clearly erroneous where coercive factors shown)
- United States v. Lay, 583 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2009) (undue influence finding sustained despite victim’s willingness)
- United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2004) (guidelines interpretation of ancillary enhancements)
- United States v. Todd, 584 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2009) (knowledge that a future action will be caused satisfies §1591)
- United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2013) (construction of §1591 and related culpability standards)
- United States v. Reid, 751 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2014) (undue influence scope across circuits)