United States v. Tymond Preston, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 8825

Preston, 18, has an IQ of 65 and substantial language deficits, placing him in the intellectual disability range; he lived on the Navajo Nation and faced a neighbor feud connected to the alleged abuse; a child alleged sexual abuse by Preston with a complex, largely uncorroborated account; FBI and Navajo investigators questioned him for about 40 minutes, recognizing his disabilities early; officers repeatedly asserted Friday as the incident date, insisted on admissions, and used leading, suggestive questions, culminating in a written confession that was largely fed by the officers themselves; Preston was charged with aggravated sexual abuse and, after suppression and plea negotiations, was convicted of a lesser offense and sentenced.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was Preston’s confession voluntary under totality of circumstances?	Preston argues the confession was involuntary due to his intellectual disability and coercive interrogation.	The government argues voluntariness can be determined without focusing on disability, under totality of circumstances.	The confession was involuntary under totality of circumstances.
Does Derrick v. Peterson control, or should it be overruled by Doody v. Ryan and subsequent precedent?	Derrick should remain good law and apply irrespective of defendant’s characteristics.	Derrick misreads Connelly and should be overruled.	Derrick is overruled; Doody governs, and individual characteristics may be considered in voluntariness.
Did the officers’ use of two-alternative questions, deception, and promises render the confession involuntary?	These techniques, along with false promises of confidentiality, coerced a vulnerable suspect.	Such techniques are not per se coercive; voluntariness depends on totality of circumstances.	The combination of tactics and Preston’s disability rendered the confession involuntary.
If the confession is involuntary, was the evidence insufficient to sustain conviction, or must retrial occur?	N/A (arises from the involuntary confession);	N/A	Conviction reversed and remanded for a new trial; sufficiency should be reconsidered without the involuntary confession.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (U.S. 2002) (mental retardation/ intellectual disability discussed in capital sentencing context)
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (U.S. 1961) (voluntariness requires weighing coercive pressure against susceptibility)
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (U.S. 2000) (multivariate, totality-of-circumstances test for voluntariness)
Connelly v. United States, 479 U.S. 157 (U.S. 1986) (mental condition relevant to susceptibility, not determinative absent coercion)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (preservation of rights, voluntariness relevance beyond custody)
Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1999) (false promises/coercive assurances render confession involuntary in some contexts)
Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc guidance on weighing circumstances in voluntariness inquiry)
Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (U.S. 1961) (youth and cognitive limitations affect voluntariness)
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (U.S. 1963) (police trickery/ false assurances to welfare of suspect violates voluntariness)
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (U.S. 1969) (false promissory statements can bear on voluntariness)