United States v. Tyler Lang, 875 F.3d 360

Background

In August 2013 Johnson and Lang traveled from California to an Illinois mink farm, released ~2,000 minks, destroyed breeding records and damaged vehicles/buildings, causing $120k–$200k in damage. They were later arrested en route to a fox farm.
State convictions for possession of burglary tools followed; the federal government charged them under the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA), 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(A),(C).
Indictment: Count I alleged conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce to damage/interfere with animal enterprises and, in connection with that purpose, damaging property (§ 43(a)(2)(C)); Count II charged damaging real/personal property used by an animal enterprise (§ 43(a)(2)(A)).
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing (1) AETA is facially overbroad under the First Amendment because it criminalizes expressive conduct that causes only economic harm; (2) AETA is unconstitutionally vague and invites discriminatory enforcement; and (3) labeling non‑violent property offenders as “terrorists” violates substantive due process.
District court denied the motion; defendants entered conditional guilty pleas reserving the right to appeal the denial. Seventh Circuit affirms: AETA is not substantially overbroad, is not void for vagueness, and the non‑codified use of “terrorism” in the Act’s title does not violate substantive due process.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether AETA is facially overbroad under the First Amendment	AETA criminalizes protected advocacy that causes only economic loss (profits/goodwill) by reading “any real or personal property” to include intangible property	AETA’s text, structure, construction clause, and legislative history show it targets damage to tangible property; pure economic harms from lawful advocacy are excluded	Not overbroad — statute construed to require damage to tangible property; penalties consider economic damage but lawful economic disruption is excluded; (e)(1) protects expressive conduct
Whether AETA is void for vagueness due to broad definition of “animal enterprise” and risk of discriminatory enforcement	The broad definition could cover many businesses selling animal products and has been enforced mainly against animal‑rights activists, inviting arbitrary enforcement	Defendants’ conduct clearly falls within the statute’s core; enforcement patterns don’t prove vagueness; elements are discernible and specific	Not void for vagueness — conduct here lies in statute’s core; no uncontrolled delegation to enforcement discretion
Whether the conspiracy clause renders AETA overbroad by criminalizing mere intent to injure profits	Conspiracy clause can be read to permit liability for conspiring to damage/interfere without intent to damage tangible property, sweeping in protected speech	Conspiracy clause refers to subsections immediately preceding it (damage to tangible property or threats of bodily harm); reading otherwise is illogical and redundant	Rejected — conspiracy provision applies to conspiring/attempting to damage tangible property or cause bodily harm, not to pure economic advocacy
Whether use of the word “terrorism” in AETA’s non‑codified title violates substantive due process	Being labeled prosecuted/convicted under a statute called “terrorism” infringes a liberty interest; akin to stigma of sex‑offender registration	Title reflects Congress’s focus on violent and intimidating acts (arson, bombing, threats); conviction under AETA does not trigger registration or automatic harsh administrative categorization	Rejected — rational‑basis review applies and the use of “terrorism” is not patently arbitrary; Congress had a rational basis for the title

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (Sup. Ct.) (limits and explains facial overbreadth doctrine)
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (Sup. Ct.) (overbreadth is strong medicine; courts employ limiting constructions)
Blum v. Holder, 744 F.3d 790 (1st Cir.) (AETA contains expression‑protecting rules of construction shielding lawful advocacy)
United States v. Rodgers, 755 F.2d 533 (7th Cir.) (standard for facial overbreadth challenges)
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Worth Bullion Group, Inc., 717 F.3d 545 (7th Cir.) (caution against acontextual dictionary definitions in statutory construction)
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (Sup. Ct.) (words in statute read in context and statutory scheme)
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (Sup. Ct.) (presumption that omissions within same Act are purposeful)
United States v. Coscia, 866 F.3d 782 (7th Cir.) (limitations on facial vagueness challenges that do not implicate First Amendment interests)
Bell v. Keating, 697 F.3d 445 (7th Cir.) (vagueness inquiry and standards)
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (Sup. Ct.) (example of vague law that permits arbitrary enforcement)
Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir.) (vagueness where an ordinance swept too broadly and was applied selectively)
United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.) (frequency of prosecution against a group does not immunize them from statutes)
Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Comty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569 (7th Cir.) (rational‑basis standard for non‑fundamental liberty interests)
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115 (Sup. Ct.) (reluctance to expand substantive‑due‑process doctrine)