United States v. Turrieta
875 F.3d 1340
| 10th Cir. | 2017Background
- Defendant Paul Turrieta was sentenced to 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based on three prior New Mexico convictions for residential burglary.
- Turrieta filed a § 2255 motion contending the district court relied on the ACCA’s residual clause, which the Supreme Court found void for vagueness in Johnson v. United States.
- The government contended the ACCA enhancement was supported independently by the Enumerated‑Offense Clause because Turrieta’s New Mexico residential burglary convictions matched the generic definition of burglary.
- The key legal question was whether New Mexico’s residential burglary statute (entry into a “dwelling house”) covers occupied vehicles, watercraft, or aircraft such that it would be broader than generic burglary and thus not an ACCA enumerated offense.
- The Tenth Circuit applied the categorical approach, examined New Mexico statutes and case law, and concluded New Mexico’s Part (A) residential burglary covers unlawful entry into a dwelling house (a building), not occupied vehicles/watercraft/aircraft.
- Because the convictions match generic burglary, they qualify as ACCA “violent felonies” under the Enumerated‑Offense Clause and the 15‑year ACCA sentence was upheld.
Issues
| Issue | Turrieta's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether New Mexico residential burglary ("dwelling house") is broader than generic burglary because it can include occupied vehicles/watercraft/aircraft | "Dwelling house" can include occupied vehicles/watercraft/aircraft (relying on jury instructions and Foulenfont) | Part (A) covers dwellings (buildings); vehicles/watercraft/aircraft are governed separately by Part (B); New Mexico case law does not show actual application to occupied conveyances | Held: "dwelling house" in Part (A) does not encompass occupied vehicles/watercraft/aircraft; convictions match generic burglary |
| Whether ACCA enhancement depends on the now‑invalid residual clause | Residual clause was relied on and is unconstitutionally vague (Johnson) | Enhancement stands because the Enumerated‑Offense Clause independently applies | Held: ACCA applies independently via the Enumerated‑Offense Clause; sentence affirmed |
| Whether state cases (e.g., Foulenfont, Ruiz, cases on mobile homes/trailers) demonstrate a realistic probability that NM applies Part (A) to conveyances | Point to jury instructions, Foulenfont, Ruiz, and isolated references to trailers/mobile homes being called dwellings | State opinions either limit scope (Foulenfont) or distinguish dwellings from conveyances (Ruiz); cited decisions do not hold that Part (A) applies to occupied conveyances | Held: No New Mexico decision shows actual application of Part (A) to occupied vehicles/watercraft/aircraft; defendant fails Gonzales realistic‑probability burden |
| Standard of review for statutory‑interpretation/category questions | N/A (procedural) | De novo review of legal conclusions; clear‑error for factual findings | Applied: de novo for legal conclusions, clear‑error for facts |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2016) (residual clause of ACCA is unconstitutionally vague)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach and generic burglary elements)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (focus on statutory elements to determine generic burglary)
- Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007) (plaintiff must show realistic probability state courts would apply statute in nongeneric manner)
- United States v. Barrett, 797 F.3d 1207 (10th Cir. 2015) (standard of review cited)
- State v. Foulenfont, 895 P.2d 1329 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (unenclosed fenced areas held not to be structures for burglary)
- State v. Ruiz, 617 P.2d 160 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (distinguishing burglary of a dwelling house from burglary of vehicles/watercraft/aircraft)
- State v. Alvarez‑Lopez, 98 P.3d 699 (N.M. 2004) (aggravated burglary references mobile home in factual summary but does not decide whether mobile home qualifies as Part (A) dwelling)