62 F. Supp. 3d 1236
N.D. Okla.2014Background
- On May 28, 2014 postal inspector and local officers went to 4405 W. Jackson St. after a suspicious overnight package addressed to “Tony Thai” was flagged; officers entered the enclosed side yard and opened the package, finding ~6 one‑pound bags of marijuana.
- Do (resident) produced his locked cell phone, unlocked it with his thumbprint, and officers reviewed texts/photos they believed showed drug activity and guns; Do later consented to a warrantless search of the house, where officers found marijuana, paraphernalia, $6,000, paperwork, and 32 firearms.
- On August 28, 2014 a confidential informant implicated Do and a package delivery; Westerfield stopped Do’s car for a failure to signal, obtained a Miranda waiver after spontaneous statements, and found ~2.5 kg marijuana in a package in Do’s trunk; Do refused a written consent to open the package.
- After Do’s stop, Westerfield detained and questioned Vinh (recognized vehicle), conducted a dog sniff, found controlled‑substance evidence in Vinh’s truck, and obtained Vinh’s consent to search his home; the court found the initial Vinh encounter was not consensual.
- During execution of an August 28 search warrant at Do’s residence, Hong (Do’s girlfriend/fiancé) was interviewed without Miranda warnings; the court concluded she was effectively in custody for purpose of questioning and suppressed her post‑identification statements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of officers’ entry into side yard / curtilage on May 28 | Gov: entry lawful or normal access; even if curtilage, Do abandoned package | Do: entry into curtilage was unconstitutional so he has standing to challenge seizure/abandonment | Court: side yard is curtilage; entry violated Fourth Amendment but Do voluntarily abandoned package; drug evidence from package admitted |
| Search of Do’s cell phone (Riley/consent) | Gov: Do voluntarily produced and unlocked phone; consent exception to warrant requirement | Do: phone taken from him / search exceeded scope | Court: consent was voluntary and not tainted by curtilage entry; scope (texts/photos) reasonable for verifying package/tracking; phone evidence admitted |
| Warrantless search of Do’s home (May 28) | Gov: Do freely consented after being told he could refuse | Do: consent coerced (threats re: father/arrest) | Court: totality shows consent voluntary (officers told him he could refuse; reasonable suspicion to detain existed); home search evidence admitted |
| Statements by Do on May 28 (Miranda) | Gov: statements voluntary and not custodial | Do: was in custody after discovery of marijuana and interrogation began before Miranda | Held: after package reveal defendant was effectively in custody; any statements after discovery and before Miranda suppressed |
| Traffic stop of Do (Aug 28) | Gov: valid stop—officer observed failure to signal; detention and searches reasonable | Do: no traffic violation observed; stop invalid | Court: Westerfield credibly saw failure to signal; stop valid, subsequent statements (post‑Miranda waiver) and vehicle evidence admissible |
| Encounter with Vinh (Aug 28) | Gov: consensual encounter; Vinh voluntarily spoke and consented to home search | Vinh: was seized/arrested immediately; could not leave; stop lacked reasonable suspicion | Court: encounter was a seizure (not consensual), unsupported by reasonable suspicion; vehicle evidence and subsequent statements suppressed; consent to search home tainted and evidence suppressed |
| Statements by Hong during warrant execution (Aug 28) | Gov: consensual interview; she was free to leave | Hong: was effectively in custody and not Mirandized | Court: interview moved into potentially incriminating questioning while she was in a police‑dominated atmosphere and not told she could leave; suppress post‑identification statements, but physical evidence seized under warrant admitted |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (warrant generally required to search cell phones)
- United States v. Cousins, 455 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2006) (factors for curtilage analysis)
- United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1993) (factors for voluntariness of consent)
- United States v. Salas, 756 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2014) (attenuation test after prior Fourth Amendment violation)
- Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (Miranda violation does not automatically taint subsequent warned statements)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (waiver of Miranda rights occurs when warning understood and statement is voluntary)
- Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (statements after Miranda warnings may still be inadmissible if tainted by prior Fourth Amendment violation)