999 F.3d 119
2d Cir.2021Background
- Trimm pled guilty to conspiring to produce sexual images of a minor; statutory mandatory minimum was 15 years and Guideline calculations yielded a life range (capped at the 30‑year statutory maximum).
- Her written plea/cooperation addendum reserved to the U.S. Attorney’s Office the sole discretion whether and how to credit cooperation, including whether to move under U.S.S.G. §5K1.1 and/or 18 U.S.C. §3553(e).
- Trimm testified at co‑defendant LaPorte’s trial; LaPorte was convicted and heavily sentenced. The Government concluded Trimm provided substantial assistance and moved under §5K1.1 (seeking a five‑level departure to 210 months) but declined to move under §3553(e) to permit a sentence below the 15‑year mandatory minimum.
- The district court twice ordered the Government to file a §3553(e) motion, found the Government acted with an unconstitutional motive and in bad faith for declining to do so, and on the second sentencing imposed a 60‑month term after “deeming” a §3553(e) motion made.
- The Government appealed; the Second Circuit held the record contained no basis for finding unconstitutional motive or bad faith, concluded the court erred in compelling or deeming a §3553(e) motion, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing before a different judge.
Issues
| Issue | Government's Argument | Trimm's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court properly found the Government acted with an unconstitutional motive in declining to file a §3553(e) motion | Prosecutor has discretion to evaluate quantity/quality of assistance; refusal to file can reflect rational cost/benefit and does not, standing alone, show unconstitutional motive | Declining to file despite substantial assistance and no misconduct shows the Government sought to limit the court’s sentencing discretion | Reversed — no evidence of unconstitutional motive; mere limitation of judicial discretion is insufficient (Wade standard) |
| Whether the Government acted in bad faith by not filing a §3553(e) motion (despite filing a §5K1.1 motion) | Good‑faith valuation can justify a §5K1.1 motion without a §3553(e) motion; plea addendum reserved sole prosecutorial discretion and warned statutory minimum may limit departures | Filing §5K1.1 but not §3553(e) after full cooperation indicates bad faith and breach of the cooperation agreement | Reversed — record shows a good‑faith, consistent assessment; disagreement over valuation is not bad faith (Melendez binary‑motion principle) |
| Whether the district court could compel or "deem" a §3553(e) motion and sentence below the mandatory minimum | The court lacks authority to force or treat as filed a §3553(e) motion absent proof of unconstitutional motive or bad faith | Court may remedy perceived unfairness by ordering or deeming the motion | Reversed — court cannot compel or deem the Government to have made a §3553(e) motion without meeting legal threshold; remand for resentencing before a different judge |
Key Cases Cited
- Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992) (threshold showing required to challenge prosecutor’s refusal to file substantial‑assistance motion)
- United States v. Melendez, 518 U.S. 120 (1996) (recognizing binary §5K1.1/§3553(e) motion system)
- United States v. Richardson, 521 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (§3553(e) reduction below statutory minimum may be based only on substantial assistance)
- United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1990) (court’s review limited to whether prosecutor acted in good faith when plea agreement vests discretion in prosecutor)
- United States v. Moeller, 383 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2004) (government’s refusal to file §3553(e) can rationally reflect assessment of quantity/quality of cooperation)
- United States v. Motley, 587 F.3d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (government need not file §3553(e) whenever it files §5K1.1)
- United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483 (2d Cir. 1992) (bad‑faith finding warranted where government withheld promised motion based on facts known at agreement time)
- United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977) (factors governing reassignment to preserve appearance of justice)