United States v. Travis Collins
699 F.3d 1039
8th Cir.2012Background
- Collins pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition after arrest evidence was challenged.
- Officers executed an outstanding arrest warrant for Collins at a Des Moines residence and encountered Stoekel, the tenant, who initially refused entry.
- Stoekel allowed limited entry into the living room after a prolonged encounter and was asked about Collins’ presence.
- Officers went upstairs and found Collins asleep in a bedroom; a firearm was in an open bag near him.
- District court credited Stoekel’s consent as voluntary and upheld the seizure as lawful under Payton/Steagald framework; the court denied suppression, and the conviction followed on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Stoekel’s consent to entry was voluntary | Collins argues consent was coerced or involuntary | State asserts consent was voluntary given the circumstances | Consent was voluntary; not clearly erroneous to find voluntariness |
| Whether officers could enter the dwelling to locate Collins without consent | Payton/Steagald require a search warrant absent exigent circumstances | Powell permits entry if reasonable belief Collins resided there and was present | Limited authority to proceed upstairs existed due to belief Collins resided there and present |
Key Cases Cited
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (arrest warrant carries limited authority to enter the suspect’s dwelling)
- Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (search warrant required to search third-party residence absent consent or exigent circumstances)
- Powell, 379 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2004) (reasonable belief suspect resides at the place and is present allows entry without a separate warrant)
- Dupree, 202 F.3d 1046 (8th Cir. 2000) (standard of review for voluntary consent)
- Correa, 641 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 2011) (context for voluntariness of consent)
- Coney, 456 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2006) (factors establishing voluntariness of consent)
- Pena-Ponce, 588 F.3d 579 (8th Cir. 2009) (“It’s ok” sufficient indication of consent to search)
- Adams, 346 F.3d 1165 (8th Cir. 2003) (fear of arrest not dispositive to voluntariness)
- Duran, 957 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992) (extreme emotional distress does not negate voluntariness)
- Yates, 479 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. Kan. 2007) (coercion not dispositive to exclusion)