963 F.3d 528
6th Cir.2020Background
- On Aug. 27, 2016, three employees and one customer at a Universal Wireless (Sprint retailer) in Coldwater, MI, were robbed at gunpoint; robbers led victims from the sales floor to a backbreak room, zip-tied them, and stole cash and phones (~$42,129).
- Tramain Hill pleaded guilty to Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951); at sentencing the PSR recommended a 4-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) (abduction) while Hill argued for a 2-level enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) (physical restraint).
- The parties agreed on the facts (forced accompaniment from sales floor to back room and zip-tying) but disputed whether the back room was a “different location” for purposes of the abduction enhancement.
- The district court applied the 4-level abduction enhancement (relying in part on Fifth Circuit precedent), resulting in a 130-month sentence at the bottom of a 130–162 guideline range.
- On appeal the Sixth Circuit reviewed the legal issue de novo and held the phrase “different location” in the abduction definition ordinarily refers to a place separate from the robbed store or bank (not a different area within it); it reversed and remanded for resentencing with the 2-level physical-restraint enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether forcing victims from a store sales floor into a back room qualifies as being “abducted” (forced to accompany to a "different location") under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A) | Hill: “Different location” means a place separate from the robbed store; moving within the store does not qualify → only 2-level physical-restraint enhancement applies | Government: “Different location” can mean any distinct position or area (even within the same building); moving victims to a back room qualifies → 4-level abduction enhancement applies | The court held that in this robbery context “different location” ordinarily means a place other than the store or bank being robbed; moving victims to a back room within the same store is not an “abduction” under § 2B3.1(b)(4)(A); apply the 2-level physical-restraint enhancement under (B). |
Key Cases Cited
- Whitfield v. United States, 574 U.S. 265 (U.S. 2015) ("accompany" requires movement beyond minimal foot movement)
- Whatley v. United States, 719 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2013) (movement within robbed premises typically not a different location)
- Eubanks v. United States, 593 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2010) (same: internal movement ordinarily not abduction)
- Buck v. United States, 847 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2017) (contrary view; internal movement can qualify)
- Archuleta v. United States, 865 F.3d 1280 (10th Cir. 2017) (split; court discusses multi-level meanings of "location")
- Reynos v. United States, 680 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2012) (cases taking broader view that internal movement may suffice)
- Osborne v. United States, 514 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2008) (broader interpretation applied)
- United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (principle that commentary governs only if it reasonably interprets the guideline)
- Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (S. Ct. 2019) (deference principles for agency/interpretive statements)
- Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (U.S. 2001) (interpretive canon: read ambiguous definitions in context)