United States v. Traficante, 966 F.3d 99

Traficante pleaded guilty (waived indictment) to cyberstalking (18 U.S.C. §§ 2261A(2)(B), 2261(b)(5)) and distribution of a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).
Facts in the PSR (unobjected to) showed repeated, serious cyber- and in-person harassment of an ex‑girlfriend (anonymous threats/calls/texts, hacking, false prostitution ads, mailing narcotics to her, shooting out windows) and similar prior conduct toward another ex‑girlfriend.
Law enforcement seized a loaded AR-15, ammunition, and other weapons from Traficante’s home. The PSR recounted aggravating aspects and prior similar acts.
Plea agreement stipulated an advisory Guidelines range of 30–37 months (offense level 19, CHC I) but preserved the parties’ rights to argue for a variance or departure.
The district court sentenced Traficante to 48 months’ imprisonment (described as both variance and departure, and increasing criminal history from I to III) plus three years’ supervised release, which included the then‑standard probation "notification of risk" condition.
After sentencing, this Court’s decision in United States v. Boles rejected the old risk condition as impermissibly vague; the Western District of New York issued a standing order revising that condition, and Traficante appealed the sentence and the risk condition.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 48‑month above‑Guidelines sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable	Government: sentence justified as a variance/departure given extraordinary, repeated conduct, aggravating PSR facts, and §3553(a) factors	Traficante: district court erred in increasing criminal history from I to III without adequate explanation and the 48‑month sentence is substantively unreasonable	Affirmed. Court adequately explained variance under §3553(a); sentence not procedurally erroneous and not substantively unreasonable (within permissible range)
Whether the "notification of risk" supervised‑release condition required vacatur/remand and whether the WDNY standing order cures Boles concerns	Government: standing order (amending the condition) addresses Boles; no remand required because the order merely clarifies future, contingent procedures	Traficante: standing order imposes a new condition without notice/hearing (Rule 43/due process) and remains unconstitutionally vague/delegates too much discretion to probation	Held moot as to the old condition. No resentencing required: standing order clarifies the condition and imposes no present burden; any vagueness or improper‑delegation objections are unripe and can be raised only if/when the court actually imposes notification

United States v. Boles, 914 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2019) (invalidated prior standard "risk" condition as impermissibly vague; remanded to clarify scope)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (articulated standard for appellate review of federal sentences — reasonableness review)
United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (explained substantive‑reasonableness standard for sentences)
United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2014) (set forth deferential abuse‑of‑discretion review for sentences)
United States v. Rosario, 386 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 2004) (oral pronouncement controls over conflicting written judgment under Fed. R. Crim. P. 43)
United States v. Thomas, 299 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2002) (vacatur where a special condition first appeared only in the written judgment and imposed unforeseeable burdens)