United States v. Torrance Cotton
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9163
8th Cir.2016Background
- DEA investigated Jeremy Poe in 2012; Poe cooperated after a January 2013 arrest with 1 kg cocaine and wore a wire in meetings with David Frazier. Frazier thereafter was arrested and 1 kg cocaine seized from his safe. Poe implicated Torrance Cotton as Frazier’s supplier.
- Cotton was indicted (May 1, 2013) for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine; convicted by jury on April 3, 2014.
- At trial the government introduced: Poe’s testimony relating Frazier’s statements naming Cotton; recorded calls where Frazier referenced “T/Torrance”; DEA testimony about Cotton’s presence at Chilimacks with a package; and Cotton’s fingerprints on the outer wrapping of the seized cocaine.
- The government also introduced Cotton’s prior drug convictions; the district court initially made provisional rulings but issued a definitive ruling admitting the convictions pre-trial and gave a limiting instruction at trial.
- Co-conspirator Frazier did not testify; his statements were admitted through Poe under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Cotton introduced portions of a post-arrest affidavit of Frazier (inconsistent statement) and the government later elicited Frazier’s post-arrest statement to police as rehabilitative evidence; the district court admitted that under Rule 806.
- Cotton claimed (1) improper admission of prior convictions (404(b)); (2) improper admission of Frazier’s post-arrest statement (Confrontation Clause and evidentiary rules); and (3) Brady violation for nondisclosure of the actual photograph shown to Poe in January 2013. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Cotton's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior convictions under Rule 404(b) | Prior convictions were unduly prejudicial and improperly admitted to show propensity | Convictions admissible to prove knowledge, intent, absence of mistake; court issued limiting instruction | Preservation: ruling became definitive pre-trial; reviewed for abuse of discretion. Any 404(b) error was harmless given strong independent evidence and limiting instruction — conviction affirmed. |
| Admission of Frazier’s post-arrest statement as rehabilitation | Admission violated Confrontation Clause and evidentiary rules; not proper rehabilitation | Statement offered to rehabilitate credibility after impeachment; admissible under Rule 806; limiting instruction given | No Confrontation Clause violation (offered for impeachment/rehabilitation). District court did not abuse discretion admitting the post-arrest statement under Rule 806 in the factual context. |
| Brady claim re: photo shown to Poe in Jan 2013 | Government suppressed the January photo (actual ID stimulus), which was favorable and material | Photo nondisclosure not material; Exhibit 1 shown at trial was used for impeachment and cross-examination occurred | No Brady violation: evidence not material; no reasonable probability result would differ; motion for new trial denied. |
| Standard of review / preservation for 404(b) objection | Trial counsel did not contemporaneously object at trial so review should be plain error | District court issued a final pre-trial ruling on March 31, 2014 overruling objection, so claim preserved | Court concluded March 31 ruling was definitive; claim preserved and reviewed for abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Young, 753 F.3d 757 (8th Cir. 2014) (preservation and 404(b) ruling guidance)
- United States v. Trogdon, 575 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2009) (404(b) admissibility factors)
- United States v. Armstrong, 782 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2015) (404(b) analysis; relevance and probative/prejudicial balancing)
- United States v. Aldridge, 664 F.3d 705 (8th Cir. 2011) (harmlessness standard for evidentiary error)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (government must disclose favorable, material evidence)
- Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867 (2006) (materiality standard for suppressed evidence)
- United States v. Hoover, 543 F.3d 448 (8th Cir. 2008) (use of prior consistent statements for rehabilitation)
- United States v. Kenyon, 397 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2005) (limits on rehabilitative prior consistent statements)