United States v. Tori K. Collins
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7389
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Tori Collins, a Wells Fargo personal banker, pled guilty to conspiracy to accept gratuities in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 215 & 371 after assisting Gerald Mack deposit stolen U.S. Treasury checks, open fraudulent accounts, and withdraw funds for him.
- Collins received cash and goods (about $6,000 and sneakers) in exchange for facilitating transactions that violated bank rules.
- Wells Fargo reimbursed intended payees and suffered $276,714.71 in losses tied to accounts Collins opened or transactions she facilitated; the district court ordered Collins to pay $251,860.31 in restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.
- At sentencing, the district court evaluated whether Collins’ conviction was an “offense against property” under the MVRA by examining the facts of her conduct (not just the statutory elements).
- Collins appealed, arguing (1) the MVRA should be applied categorically (based on statutory elements), so her gratuities conviction is not an "offense against property," (2) even considering facts, her gratuities offense was not an offense against property or one committed by fraud/deceit, and (3) her conduct did not proximately cause Wells Fargo’s losses.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a conviction for conspiring to accept bank gratuities is an “offense against property” under the MVRA | Collins: The court must use the categorical approach (look only to statutory elements); those elements are not "against property." | Government: Courts may examine underlying conduct; Collins’ actions targeted and misappropriated bank property. | Court rejected the categorical approach for § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) and held factual inquiry is appropriate; Collins’ conduct was an offense against property. |
| Whether the clause “including those committed by fraud or deceit” broadens the MVRA category beyond property-directed offenses | Collins: The clause creates a broad extension that covers her gratuities scheme. | Government: The phrase is illustrative; fraud/deceit offenses still must target property. | Court held the “including” clause is illustrative and does not expand the category to cover offenses that do not have property as their object. |
| Whether Collins’ gratuities offense involved an intent to derive unlawful benefit from property | Collins: Acceptance of gratuities is not necessarily directed at property. | Government: Collins admitted withdrawing bank funds and delivering them to Mack; she derived an unlawful benefit from Wells Fargo’s property. | Court found Collins intentionally derived unlawful pecuniary benefit from Wells Fargo’s funds, satisfying the property-object requirement. |
| Whether Collins’ conduct proximately caused Wells Fargo’s losses | Collins: Losses were caused by Mack’s fraud, not her gratuities offense. | Government: Collins’ facilitation was a foreseeable and direct cause of the bank’s reimbursements. | Court affirmed that Collins’ conduct proximately caused the losses; restitution was not clearly erroneous. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (discusses when courts should apply the categorical approach and significance of the word “committed”)
- United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 2002) (conspiracy to illegally excavate public land qualified as an offense against property)
- United States v. Luis, 765 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2014) (construed “against property” to include infringement on victim’s property interests)
- United States v. Singletary, 649 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2011) (treated fraud/wire fraud as offenses against property under the MVRA)
- United States v. Huff, 609 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010) (wire fraud restitution under MVRA requires full compensation of victim’s loss)
- Keelan v. United States, 786 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2015) (applied categorical approach in § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(i) context; distinguished here)
- United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2006) (proximate causation in MVRA context: foreseeable consequences of the offense justify restitution)