United States v. Tony Edward Denson
963 F.3d 1080
| 11th Cir. | 2020Background
- Denson pled guilty in 2009 to distributing crack cocaine (Count III) and being a felon in possession of firearms (Count IV); he had multiple prior Florida felony convictions and was designated a career offender.
- At sentencing the court adopted the PSI, applied the career-offender guideline, and imposed concurrent terms: 262 months (drug count) + 8 years supervised release, and 120 months (firearm count).
- The First Step Act §404 made certain Fair Sentencing Act reforms retroactive; Denson’s crack quantity fell below the Fair Sentencing Act thresholds, making him eligible for a reduced sentence.
- The district court appointed counsel, set an April 18, 2019 hearing, but the government moved to resolve the motion on the written record; Denson opposed and requested to be present.
- The district court canceled the hearing, reduced Denson’s drug sentence to 188 months with 6 years supervised release (firearm sentence unchanged), and denied his motion to appear.
- On appeal the sole legal question was whether the First Step Act or due process required a resentencing hearing with Denson present; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding no such requirement and no due process violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the First Step Act itself requires a resentencing hearing with the defendant present | Denson: §404(c) and the Act’s broad discretion mean a "complete review on the merits" requires a hearing in his presence | Government: The Act is silent on hearings; it authorizes but does not mandate resentencing or any particular procedure | Court: First Step Act does not require a hearing; its text imposes no procedural right to be present |
| Whether Rule 43 or the Due Process Clause required Denson’s presence at the §3582(c)(1)(B) proceeding | Denson: Due process requires presence because the court exercises broad discretion affecting his sentence | Government: Rule 43(b)(4) expressly permits sentence-reduction proceedings under §3582(c) without the defendant’s presence; no separate constitutional right exists | Court: Rule 43 does not require presence for §3582(c) proceedings; therefore no additional due process right was violated |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act does not mandate a hearing)
- United States v. Williams, 943 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act contains no hearing requirement)
- United States v. Brown, 879 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (discusses when resentencing may be a critical stage; limited to §2255 context)
- United States v. Thomason, 940 F.3d 1166 (11th Cir. 2019) (defendant has no absolute right to be present when court modifies sentence under §3582)
- Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012) (explaining Fair Sentencing Act’s effect on crack-cocaine penalties)
- United States v. Parrish, 427 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (Rule 43’s coverage is at least as broad as the Due Process right to be present)
- United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2019) (First Step Act does not authorize plenary resentencing beyond Fair Sentencing Act changes)