25 F.4th 1097
8th Cir.2022Background
- Collins pled guilty to sex trafficking of children (18 U.S.C. § 1591); his written plea agreement said the government would not seek an obstruction enhancement and would recommend acceptance-of-responsibility credit as of the plea date, but reserved the right to oppose acceptance if Collins engaged in post-plea obstructive conduct.
- After the plea, the government submitted offense-conduct statements reporting Collins’ contacts with witnesses (including repeated calls to a protected victim despite a no-contact order); it initially recommended acceptance credit but later opposed that credit citing those contacts.
- The PSIR recommended an obstruction enhancement and denied acceptance credit; the government ultimately abandoned the obstruction enhancement but continued to oppose full acceptance credit (refusing to move for the discretionary third-level reduction).
- At sentencing the district court rejected an obstruction enhancement, accepted a two-level acceptance reduction (based on Collins withdrawing many PSIR objections after being warned they were likely false), and varied one level downward in expectation the government should have moved for the third level; Collins received a 210-month term.
- On appeal Collins argued the government breached the plea agreement by relying on pre-plea conduct to contest acceptance and by otherwise failing to honor the bargain; the government defended its use of pre-plea facts and argued the ultimate guidelines outcome matched the plea.
- The Eighth Circuit held the government breached the plea agreement by using pre-plea conduct to deny acceptance credit, found the breach uncured, vacated the sentence, and remanded for the district court to determine the appropriate remedy.
Issues
| Issue | Collins' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the government breached the plea agreement by relying on pre-plea conduct to oppose acceptance-of-responsibility credit | The government promised Collins qualified for acceptance as of the plea date and may only oppose based on post-plea conduct; using pre-plea conduct breaches that promise | The plea reservation allowed the government to oppose acceptance if defendant’s overall conduct (including pre-plea acts) showed lack of acceptance; moreover the ultimate guidelines range matched the plea | Breach: Court held the government impermissibly relied on pre-plea conduct to contest acceptance; ambiguity construed against government (following Mosley) |
| Whether the breach was cured by later government actions and the district court’s rulings | Collins argued the government never unequivocally retracted its contrary position and continued to resist the third-level reduction, so the breach was not cured | Government pointed to the district court’s practical adherence to the plea (two-level reduction and sentencing consistent with plea) as effectively curing any error | Not cured: Court found the government’s partial concessions and continued reliance on pre-plea conduct insufficient to cure the breach (citing Brown and decisions requiring unequivocal retraction) |
| Whether harmless-error review or outcome parity excuses the breach | Collins argued breach of plea agreement is structural and not subject to harmless-error salvation | Government contended Collins "got what he bargained for" because the guidelines outcome matched the plea terms | Harmless error inapplicable: Court rejected excusing the breach based on outcome parity (following Santobello and Mosley) |
| Appropriate remedy for the breach | Collins sought relief (including possible withdrawal of plea) because the government’s breach undermined due process | Government urged no substantial harm given sentencing result and resisted vacatur of sentence | Vacated sentence and remanded: Court left remedy (specific performance v. plea withdrawal) to the district court in the first instance |
Key Cases Cited
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (breach of plea agreement implicates due process)
- United States v. Mosley, 505 F.3d 804 (8th Cir. 2007) (government may not use pre-plea conduct to deny acceptance when it promised adjustment as of plea date)
- United States v. Brown, 5 F.4th 913 (8th Cir. 2021) (government must offer unequivocal retraction to cure a plea-breach in many circuits)
- United States v. Selvy, 619 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2010) (interpretation/enforcement of plea agreements reviewed de novo)
- United States v. Guzman, 707 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2013) (plea agreements interpreted under contract-law principles)
- United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 1996) (two primary remedies for plea-breach: specific performance or withdrawal of plea)
- United States v. Lewis, 673 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2011) (ambiguities in plea agreements construed against the government)
- United States v. Gomez, 271 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2001) (district court best positioned to choose remedy for breach)
- United States v. E.V., 500 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 2007) (court requires meticulous fidelity to plea agreement)