United States v. Todd Stands Alone, 11 F.4th 532

Todd Stands Alone, a federal inmate in Wisconsin, reacted angrily after officers confiscated items from his cell; he grabbed a fire extinguisher, officer Decker used pepper spray, and Stands Alone discharged the extinguisher, blowing pepper spray chemicals toward Decker and causing visual impairment and chemical burns.
A grand jury indicted Stands Alone under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b) for knowingly and forcibly resisting, intimidating, and interfering with a federal officer and in doing so inflicting bodily injury.
Stands Alone waived a jury and, one day before trial, filed briefs arguing the indictment was defective because it did not allege "assault," which he contended is an essential element of every § 111 offense; he argued that without an assault allegation he could only be convicted of an infraction.
The district court exercised its discretion to reach the claim on the merits, held that § 111 lists six distinct verbs (forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, interferes), and concluded assault is not an essential element of every § 111 offense.
The district court convicted Stands Alone under § 111(b) (enhanced penalty for inflicting bodily injury), and he appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether "assault" is an essential element of every § 111 offense (including § 111(b))	Stands Alone: assault is a required element; indictment did not allege assault, so enhanced § 111(b) punishment improper and only an infraction could be charged	Government: § 111(a)(1) lists six distinct, disjunctive verbs; conviction under § 111(b) requires proof of one or more of those acts plus bodily injury, not assault specifically	Court affirmed: assault is not an essential element of every § 111 offense; reading assault as required would render the other verbs superfluous and produce an absurd result

United States v. Wolfname, 835 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2016) (Tenth Circuit held assault is an essential element of every § 111(a)(1) offense)
United States v. Vallery, 437 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2006) (considered whether misdemeanor "simple assault" provision applied to the entire § 111(a); addressed felony vs. misdemeanor sentencing scope)
United States v. Briley, 770 F.3d 267 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejected assault-as-required reading; emphasized surplusage/absurdity of that interpretation)
United States v. Williams, 602 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2010) (held misdemeanor conviction under § 111(a)(1) does not require underlying assaultive conduct)
United States v. Gagnon, 553 F.3d 1021 (6th Cir. 2009) (interpreted "simple assault" as a term of art encompassing any of the six proscribed actions)
United States v. McIntosh, 753 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 2014) (described § 111 as a single crime with six alternative means of commission)
Feola v. United States, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (recognizing § 111 protects federal officers and federal functions)
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017) (interpretive principle that each word in a statute must be given effect)