United States v. Todd
ACM 38988
| A.F.C.C.A. | Jun 28, 2017Background
- Appellant pleaded guilty under a PTA to multiple specifications of wrongfully possessing child pornography; other charges (including one involving AA) were withdrawn/dismissed per the PTA. The military judge sentenced him to a BCD, 5 months confinement, and reduction to E‑1; convening authority approved.
- Appellant had sexual/explicit communications and exchanged sexual images with four teenage females (AC, AG, LC, AA) when they were minors; he stipulated to facts related to some dismissed charges and agreed AA could give an unsworn victim statement at sentencing.
- After trial the SJA solicited victim impact statements from victims of convicted offenses and from AA (whose related charge had been dismissed); AA’s statement was attached to the SJAR and served on defense; defense did not timely object to the SJAR contents.
- At sentencing AC gave an unsworn statement asserting she was treated for depression after her relationship with Appellant; defense sought reconsideration of a pretrial Mil. R. Evid. 513 motion for production of AC’s mental‑health records, but the military judge ruled the PTA waived waivable motions and declined to order in camera review.
- Appellant also alleged the military judge curtailed defense sentencing argument; that claim was raised under Grostefon and summarily rejected by the court.
- On appeal the court reviewed post‑trial processing de novo, applied plain‑error and waiver principles, and affirmed findings and sentence as there was no material prejudice to Appellant’s substantial rights.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Solicitation/consideration of AA’s victim impact statement in SJAR | AA was not a "victim" under Art. 6b and R.C.M.1105A, so SJA should not have solicited/attached her statement; its inclusion prejudiced clemency | Defense had the SJAR and could comment but did not; Appellant himself made facts of dismissed charges part of record and agreed AA could speak at sentencing | Court declined to decide victim status but found no colorable showing of prejudice; no new post‑trial processing ordered |
| In camera review/production of AC’s mental‑health records (Mil. R. Evid. 513) | AC’s statement referenced depression; military judge should have conducted threshold in camera review (Klemick test) or ordered DuBay hearing | PTA expressly waived all waivable motions including pretrial discovery motions; waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, so right to litigate production was extinguished | Court held PTA waiver extinguished Appellant’s right to seek production; no appellate relief; no need to apply Klemick or order DuBay |
| Curtailment of defense sentencing argument | Military judge improperly limited defense argument at sentencing | Issue raised under Grostefon; court considered and summarily rejected it | Court summarily rejected claim; no relief warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- LeBlanc v. United States, 74 M.J. 650 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.) (standard for post‑trial processing review)
- Scalo v. United States, 60 M.J. 435 (C.A.A.F.) (plain‑error standard for forfeited SJAR objections and clemency prejudice requirement)
- Klemick v. United States, 65 M.J. 576 (N‑M. Ct. Crim. App.) (three‑part test for threshold showing to warrant in camera review of privileged mental‑health records)
- Cron v. United States, 73 M.J. 718 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.) (PTA waivers can encompass production of sentencing witness mental‑health records)
- Lundy v. United States, 63 M.J. 299 (C.A.A.F.) (PTA interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo)
- Mezzanatto v. United States, 513 U.S. 196 (U.S. 1995) (defendant may knowingly waive constitutional protections)