United States v. Tobin
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7420
11th Cir.2012Background
- From 2002–2005, Jude LaCour ran Jive Network selling prescription drugs via hundreds of websites and online questionnaires; prescriptions were generated after doctors reviewed orders only from the questionnaire, with no in-person exams or verification of identity.
- Jive Network shipped millions of Schedule III/IV pills and earned over $85 million; customers often lied about identity due to addiction.
- Three doctors (Tobin, Baranwal, Pickens) approved orders; one pharmacist (Chebssi) dispensed them; Tobin approved 40,000+ orders, Baranwal 61,000+, Pickens 40,000+, Chebssi 21,000+.
- A 2008 indictment and subsequent superseding indictments charged conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and multiple distributions under § 841(a)(1); LaCour faced additional money-laundering counts.
- A jury convicted all five appellants on several counts; LaCour's sentence was later vacated and remanded for re-sentencing before a different judge; others’ sentences were affirmed.
- Appellants challenged multiple trial rulings and issues on appeal; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed most convictions, vacated LaCour’s sentence, and remanded for re-sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rule of lenity and vagueness | CSA ambiguous pre- Haight Act; lenity should apply. | CSA ambiguous about Internet prescriptions and in-person requirements. | Lenity rejected; CSA clear that distribution without a valid prescription is unlawful, regardless of channel. |
| State of mind under § 841(a)(1) | Knowledge standard suffices; evidence of good faith irrelevant to distribution counts. | Defendants’ good-faith beliefs should be relevant. | Knowledge, not willfulness, governs § 841(a)(1); good-faith evidence limited to instructions consistent with the law. |
| State of mind under § 846 (conspiracy) | Willfulness not required for conspiracy under § 846. | Willfulness required; evidence of advice of counsel should be admissible. | Willfulness required; district court erred in excluding some evidence, but not to the extent of reversing all convictions; no substantial influence found. |
| Meaning of proceeds under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) | Santos requires definition of proceeds as profits. | Santos's plurality not controlling; should not redefine proceeds as profits here. | Santos does not control; district court properly declined to define proceeds as profits. |
| Sufficiency of the evidence | Evidence showed distributors/approvers acted; proper verdicts. | Some counts lacked sufficient proof (e.g., shipments, or preexisting actions). | Evidence supported most convictions; specific challenges rejected; some conspiracy-related issues discussed but not granting new trials. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cruz-Valdez, 773 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1985) (willfulness element in § 841(a)(1) cases)
- United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2006) (objective vs. subjective standard for 'usual course of professional practice')
- United States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2008) (good-faith belief framework for prescribing conduct)
- United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1986) (good-faith standard in evaluating 'usual course' prescribing behavior)
- United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (definition of proceeds in money-laundering context; plurality on profits)
- United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (willfulness concept and conspiracy basics)
- Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (federal structure; deference to state professional standards)