United States v. Tobian Ponder
20-14043
11th Cir.Jul 20, 2021Background
- In 1996 Ponder and co-conspirators committed four armed robberies (three fast-food restaurants in Miami/Hialeah), threatening employees with firearms and stealing over $4,000; in one robbery Ponder beat the owner with a firearm and threatened to kill him.
- In 1998 a jury convicted Ponder of conspiracy and multiple Hobbs Act robberies, multiple § 924(c) firearm counts, possession as a felon, and possessing a stolen firearm; the district court sentenced him to 1,015 months’ imprisonment under the then-mandatory consecutive § 924(c) regime.
- Ponder moved for compassionate release in 2020, arguing (1) the First Step Act’s changes to § 924(c) would produce a shorter sentence if applied today and (2) his medical conditions (diabetes, sleep apnea, cellulitis) increased COVID-19 risk.
- The government conceded the medical conditions could be extraordinary and compelling but opposed release on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) grounds and argued the First Step Act changes were not retroactive and thus not an extraordinary and compelling reason.
- The district court denied relief, finding release would endanger the community and would not be consistent with the § 3553(a) factors; it also stated Ponder’s age mitigated his medical risk.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed: Bryant forecloses treating non‑retroactive § 924(c) changes as an "other" extraordinary reason under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, and even assuming extraordinary reasons existed, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying release based on § 3553(a).
Issues
| Issue | Ponder's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the First Step Act’s non-retroactive change to § 924(c) is an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for compassionate release | The change would significantly shorten his sentence today and thus is an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence | Per Eleventh Circuit precedent and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 commentary, non-retroactive sentencing changes are not an "other" extraordinary reason | Denied: Bryant controls; § 1B1.13 governs and does not include the First Step Act change as an extraordinary reason |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) | Ponder argued the court may not have considered the First Step Act issue and that his medical risk supports release | The court relied on the serious nature of the offenses, violent conduct, extensive criminal history (including escape), and danger to community to deny relief | Affirmed: Ponder did not challenge the § 3553(a)-based denial on appeal; in any event the denial was not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908 (11th Cir. 2021) (standard of review: abuse of discretion for compassionate-release denials)
- Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2019) (framework for identifying abuse of discretion errors)
- United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is the applicable policy statement and does not permit courts to craft "other" extraordinary reasons beyond its commentary)
- Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014) (issues not properly raised on appeal are deemed abandoned)