United States v. Tkhilaishvili
926 F.3d 1
| 1st Cir. | 2019Background
- Torosyan agreed to invest roughly $500,000 to open a suboxone clinic (AHC/HMG) with David and Jambulat Tkhilaishvili; formal operating agreements preserved Torosyan's special consent authority and included duty-of-loyalty forfeiture provisions.
- After significant personal funding (~$580,000) and construction delays, defendants demanded Torosyan relinquish consent authority and gave 5% of his interest to a friend; they threatened violence and referenced prior violent acts.
- Torosyan reported threats to counsel and the FBI, wore a recording device, and captured incriminating statements by David; he later invoked the duty-of-loyalty provision to remove the defendants.
- A federal grand jury charged both defendants with conspiring and attempting Hobbs Act extortion; David was also charged with two counts of embezzlement from a health-care benefit program.
- After a week-long jury trial, both defendants were convicted on all counts; on appeal the First Circuit affirmed the Hobbs Act convictions, reversed one embezzlement count against David (count 3), and remanded for resentencing and restitution adjustments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for Hobbs Act extortion (conspiracy & attempt) | Government: threats and recorded statements show defendants sought to obtain Torosyan's property (ownership interest) and thus attempted extortion. | Defendants: transfer to a third party (friend) cannot constitute "obtaining"; ownership interest lacked value; insufficient effect on interstate commerce. | Affirmed: transfer to a third party can satisfy "obtaining"; ownership interest is "property"; evidence supported at least a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. |
| Interstate-commerce element for Hobbs Act when victim is an individual | Government: de minimis/potential effect suffices; clinic’s interstate purchases and Medicare reimbursements connect crime to commerce. | Defendants: heightened showing required because victim is an individual; clinic’s operations were purely intrastate. | Affirmed: de minimis standard applies; evidence (out-of-state purchases, Medicare reimbursements, risk of depleted investor funds) satisfied nexus. |
| Admissibility of prior-acts (Rule 404(b)) evidence of violence | Government: prior violent acts are specially relevant to defendants’ intent and to Torosyan’s state of mind (fear). | Defendants: prejudicial and not probative; admission was unfair. | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion—acts were specially relevant and probative; Rule 403 balance acceptable with limiting instructions. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for embezzlement (18 U.S.C. § 669) as to count 4 | Government: David withdrew $2,000 contrary to his agreement with Torosyan; AHC was a health-care benefit program (stipulated). | David: AHC was not a health-care benefit program at time; withdrawals were from HMG not AHC; withdrawal was authorized. | Mixed: conviction on count 3 vacated (government conceded); conviction on count 4 upheld—David had stipulated AHC was a health-care program and evidence supported unlawful withdrawal; some arguments were waived. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Brissette, 919 F.3d 670 (1st Cir.) (third-party transfer can satisfy Hobbs Act "obtaining")
- United States v. Cruz-Arroyo, 461 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2006) (depletion-of-assets theory to satisfy interstate-commerce element)
- United States v. McCormack, 371 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2004) (caution applying commerce nexus when victim is individual)
- United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (clarifying McCormack: heightened scrutiny refers to analysis, not higher proof burden)
- United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 2001) (Hobbs Act applies broadly to extortion of property; Medicare/reimbursement nexus supports commerce element)
- United States v. Goodoak, 836 F.2d 708 (1st Cir. 1988) (victim’s beliefs about perpetrator’s prior acts relevant to inducement of fear)
- United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058 (1st Cir. 1993) (ineffective-assistance claims ordinarily must be raised in district court via §2255)