942 F.3d 228
5th Cir.2019Background:
- In spring–summer 2012 CB&I pursued acquisition of The Shaw Group; final agreement announced July 30, 2012.
- Kelly Liu worked in Shaw’s Financial Planning & Analysis (FP&A) group and had access to due diligence materials, participated in atypical updates to the firm’s valuation model (“Maggie”), and took calls with Morgan Stanley bankers about EBITDA.
- From July 18–27, 2012 Liu, her boyfriend Salvador Russo, neighbor Diemo Ho, and Vic Ho exchanged a high volume of calls/texts timed with trades; an IP address Liu regularly used accessed Vic’s brokerage account.
- Vic bought Shaw call options and sold them on July 30 for roughly $294,000; Russo (through his mother’s account) bought Shaw stock and realized modest profit; other testimony indicated Liu allegedly admitted passing along the tip.
- Liu was indicted, convicted of one count of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371) and two counts of securities fraud (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 78ff), denied severance, sentenced to 16 months concurrent, and appealed arguing insufficiency of the evidence and abuse of discretion in denying severance.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for insider trading (possession/materiality/disclosure/scienter) | Govt: Liu had actual knowledge from due diligence materials, out-of-cycle model updates, insider communications, and admitted disclosures; phone logs, IP access, and trading pattern supported disclosure and scienter. | Liu: At most had potential access or rumor-based information; no proof she possessed or disclosed material nonpublic information or had intent to defraud. | Affirmed. Jury could rationally find possession, materiality, disclosure, and scienter on the presented circumstantial and testimonial evidence. |
| Conspiracy to commit securities fraud | Govt: Agreement inferred from concerted communications, voluntary participation, and overt acts (trades and coordinated communications). | Liu: Communications could have occurred absent a criminal agreement; no affirmative proof of intentional agreement. | Affirmed. Evidence supported inference of agreement, knowledge, and overt acts. |
| Severance (Rule 14) | Govt: Joint trial appropriate; limiting instructions mitigate spillover prejudice and federal preference favors joint trials. | Liu: Prejudice from evidence against codefendants (e.g., Vic’s tax issues, out-of-court statements) required separate trial. | Affirmed. District court did not abuse discretion; jury instructions provided adequate protection and spillover alone was insufficient. |
| Personal benefit element for tipper liability | Govt: Close personal relationship with Russo/Diemo supports inference of a personal benefit to Liu for tipping. | Liu: (largely conceded the relationship) contested sufficiency of other elements, but argued no actionable benefit beyond friendship. | Affirmed. The close relationship supports an inference of personal benefit under controlling precedents. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (framework for tipper/tippee liability and personal benefit requirement)
- Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (affirming Dirks principles for insider-tip liability)
- United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (misappropriation theory and fraud-based requirements)
- TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (materiality standard: alters the total mix of information)
- Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (adopts TSC standard in §10(b) context)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency review: any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (Rule 14 severance principles and preference for limiting instructions)
- United States v. Mylett, 97 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1996) (insider confirmation of merger rumors can be material)
- S.E.C. v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1997) (lesser specificity required where merger discussions are actual and serious)
- Taylor v. First Union Corp., 857 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing preliminary, speculative talks from material information)
