United States v. Tineimalo Adkins
883 F.3d 1207
9th Cir.2018Background
- Adkins, a member of a prison gang, led an unprovoked multi-person assault on a rival inmate; a jury convicted him of a Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3), (2).
- Count alleged Adkins committed an assault in violation of Hawaii Penal Code §§ 707–710; Adkins proposed jury instructions using Hawaii’s definitions including a Hawaii definition of “knowingly” that included a self‑defense formulation.
- The district court instead instructed the jury with a broader federal definition of “knowingly” that omitted the state self‑defense language; Adkins objected and appealed the instruction.
- At sentencing the government sought career‑offender treatment under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on three prior Hawaii convictions: first‑degree unlawful imprisonment (1997), third‑degree sexual assault (1997), and first‑degree burglary (2003); the court treated at least two as crimes of violence and increased Adkins’s guideline range, leading to a 210‑month sentence.
- While the appeal was pending the Sentencing Commission removed §4B1.2’s residual clause (Amendment 798) and the Supreme Court decided Beckles v. United States holding the Guidelines’ residual clause not void for vagueness; the Ninth Circuit therefore applied the residual clause to Adkins’s priors.
- The Ninth Circuit found the federal jury‑instruction choice erroneous but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and concluded Hawaii first‑degree burglary and first‑degree unlawful imprisonment qualify as "crimes of violence" under §4B1.2’s residual clause, affirming conviction and sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Adkins' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jury instruction definition of “knowingly” | Court should have used Hawaii Penal Code definition (includes self‑defense); omission prejudiced him | Federal/generic definition acceptable in VICAR instruction | Court erred in using federal definition but error was harmless; conviction affirmed |
| Whether Sentencing Commission's deletion of residual clause is retroactive | Deletion should apply to reduce guideline exposure | Deletion not retroactive; clause valid at sentencing | Deletion not retroactive; apply law as of sentencing |
| Whether Hawaii first‑degree burglary is a "crime of violence" under §4B1.2 residual clause | (Implied) challenging classification | Burglary fits residual‑clause two‑part test | Burglary qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause |
| Whether Hawaii first‑degree unlawful imprisonment is a "crime of violence" under §4B1.2 residual clause | (Implied) challenging classification | Unlawful imprisonment (707‑721(1)(a)) qualifies because it exposes victim to risk of serious bodily injury and is similar in kind to burglary | Unlawful imprisonment (707‑721(1)(a)) qualifies as a crime of violence under the residual clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (struck ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (held Guidelines’ residual clause not void for vagueness)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (Begay two‑part test for residual clause)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (residual‑clause framework)
- Park v. United States, 649 F.3d 1175 (Ninth Circuit application of Begay/James test)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (divisibility and use of conviction record)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (Johnson changed substantive reach; relevant to retroactivity analysis)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (use of plea agreement to identify predicate conviction)
- Terrell v. United States, 593 F.3d 1084 (burglary risk analysis in Ninth Circuit)
- Mayer v. United States, 560 F.3d 948 (attempted burglary as crime of violence)
- Harrington v. United States, 689 F.3d 124 (false imprisonment similar in kind to burglary)
- Capler v. United States, 636 F.3d 321 (unlawful restraint/false imprisonment qualifies under residual clause)
- Pimentel v. United States, 346 F.3d 285 (prejudice from omitting state self‑defense instruction in VICAR context)
- Carrillo v. United States, 229 F.3d 177 (state law instruction required in some VICAR cases)
- Anchrum v. United States, 590 F.3d 795 (harmless‑error standard for jury instructions)
- Lee v. United States, 821 F.3d 1124 (Ninth Circuit guidance on §4B1.2 residual clause analysis)
- Miller v. United States, 822 F.2d 828 (government may withdraw concession after intervening Supreme Court precedent)