United States v. Timothy White Plume
847 F.3d 624
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- On Dec. 8, 2012, Timothy White Plume was at home with his wife Natalie and her infant grandson L.L.; L.L. suffered catastrophic, non-accidental head trauma and a leg fracture while White Plume was alone with the child.
- L.L. sustained complex skull fractures consistent with high-force trauma; he is now blind, deaf, and severely cognitively impaired.
- White Plume gave inconsistent statements: initial denials, alternate attributions to a skin bump or Natalie, then admissions he threw L.L. off a bed in anger, and later testimony claiming blackout and not witnessing a fall; he wrote an apology note to officers.
- Prior to trial, White Plume sought to introduce evidence and an audio-excerpt referencing Natalie’s prior child-abuse incident (tribal jail, anger-management order). The district court excluded that evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and as not intrinsic.
- A jury convicted White Plume of assault resulting in serious bodily injury and child abuse; he appealed asserting (1) insufficiency of the evidence, (2) erroneous exclusion of Natalie’s prior child-abuse evidence, and (3) Confrontation Clause error by limiting cross-examination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence to convict | Evidence was insufficient to prove White Plume caused L.L.’s injuries | Jury could rely on circumstantial proof; defendant was alone with child when acute injury occurred; inconsistent statements and apology support guilt | Affirmed: evidence sufficient (viewed in light most favorable to verdict) |
| Admissibility of Natalie’s prior child-abuse acts (res gestae / reverse 404(b)) | Evidence shows household history/context and implicates Natalie as the abuser (reverse 404(b)) | Prior acts unrelated to L.L., different victims/injuries; evidence is propensity and speculative; admission would distract and invite mini-trials | Affirmed exclusion: not intrinsic; barred as improper propensity evidence under Rule 404(b) |
| Use of prior acts to show intent, motive, or identity | Prior acts show Natalie’s motive (overwhelmed caregiver) or distinctive modus operandi pointing to her identity | No evidence Natalie’s state of mind on Dec. 8 was at issue; acts lack the required similarity for identity; connection is speculative | Affirmed: prior acts not admissible to prove intent, motive, or identity |
| Confrontation Clause — limitation on cross-examining Natalie about prior abuse | Exclusion prevented effective cross-examination to show bias/motive to blame White Plume | Cross-examination on bias was allowed in other respects (false-statement conviction, inconsistencies); prior-abuse inquiry had low probative value and risked confusion | Affirmed: no Confrontation Clause violation; district court reasonably limited cross-examination |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jenkins, 792 F.3d 931 (8th Cir.) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- United States v. Gray, 700 F.3d 377 (8th Cir.) (standard for affirming jury verdicts on circumstantial evidence)
- United States v. White, 794 F.3d 913 (8th Cir.) (non-accidental acute injury during defendant’s sole custody supports inference of guilt)
- United States v. Iron Hawk, 612 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir.) (acute, non-accidental injury while defendant had sole custody supports conviction)
- United States v. Brooks, 715 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir.) (intrinsic evidence doctrine: evidence that completes the story is admissible)
- United States v. Battle, 774 F.3d 504 (8th Cir.) (reverse 404(b) requires non-propensity purpose; district court discretion to exclude to avoid distraction)
- United States v. LeCompte, 99 F.3d 274 (8th Cir.) (higher similarity required to admit prior acts to prove identity)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (Confrontation Clause requires opportunity for effective cross-examination; trial court has latitude to impose reasonable limits)
- Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985) (Confrontation Clause guarantees opportunity for effective cross-examination, not unlimited cross-examination)