United States v. Timothy Ward
972 F.3d 364
| 4th Cir. | 2020Background
- In 2018 Timothy Ward pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 841; a probation officer designated him a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on prior convictions.
- Ward had a 2001 federal conviction (possession with intent to distribute crack) and two Virginia felony convictions under Va. Code § 18.2-248 for possession with intent to distribute heroin.
- The career-offender designation raised Ward’s Guidelines range from 24–30 months to 151–188 months; the district court imposed 10 years after granting a partial downward departure.
- Ward objected that his Virginia heroin convictions do not qualify as “controlled substance offenses” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) because Virginia’s definition of controlled substances is broader than the federal Controlled Substances Act.
- The district court rejected the objection; the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo whether Ward’s Virginia § 18.2-248 convictions categorically meet the Guidelines’ definition and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Ward's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Virginia § 18.2-248 convictions qualify as a “controlled substance offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) | § 4B1.2(b) should incorporate the federal CSA definition of “controlled substance,” so Virginia’s broader schedules make § 18.2-248 overbroad and not a categorical match | The Guidelines refer to offenses “under federal or state law”; for state convictions the state statute’s elements and punishments govern, so § 18.2-248 categorically meets § 4B1.2(b)’s criteria | The Fourth Circuit held § 18.2-248 qualifies: the statute’s elements and Virginia’s drug schedules satisfy § 4B1.2(b), so both Virginia convictions count as predicates for career-offender treatment |
| Role of the Jerome presumption (favoring uniform federal standard) | Jerome presumption requires using federal definition absent clear indication otherwise, so federal schedules should control | The Guidelines’ text disjunctively includes state law; the Commission could have cross-referenced the CSA if it intended a federal-only definition, so Jerome is overcome | The court concluded the Guidelines’ language and structure show Congress/Commission authorized use of state-law definitions for state offenses, so the presumption does not prohibit using state schedules |
| Whether the modified categorical approach was required here | (Alternate) Because § 18.2-248 is divisible by substance, apply the modified categorical approach and Shepard documents to confirm Ward’s convictions were for heroin (a federally controlled drug) | The court found § 18.2-248 meets § 4B1.2(b) categorically and therefore did not need to resolve the modified-categorical question | The panel declined to rely on the modified categorical analysis because it concluded the statute categorically matched § 4B1.2(b); Chief Judge Gregory concurred in judgment but argued the court should have applied the modified categorical approach per circuit precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779 (2020) (describes the two categorical methodologies and guides whether to ask if a prior conviction "meets" a criterion)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (explains the categorical approach was adopted to avoid leaving predicate status to state-law variations)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (explains the modified categorical approach is a tool for divisible statutes)
- Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943) (presumption against making federal law application depend on state law unless a plain indication otherwise)
- Mills v. United States, 485 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2007) (Fourth Circuit looked to ordinary meaning and state statute—rejected importing CSA definition for “counterfeit substance”)
- Cucalon v. Barr, 958 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2020) (held Virginia § 18.2-248 is divisible by prohibited substance and applied the modified categorical approach in a related context)
- Bah v. Barr, 950 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2020) (analyzed divisibility of Virginia drug statutes and use of modified categorical approach)
- Townsend v. United States, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018) (reads “controlled substance” in § 4B1.2(b) against a federal interpretive anchor; the Second Circuit favored using federal schedules)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (standard for procedural and substantive reasonableness of sentences)