United States v. Timothy Horton
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18423
4th Cir.2012Background
- Horton, a felon, was convicted for possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 and sentenced to life.
- The August 10, 2007 incident at Horton's girlfriend Timeca Bryant’s home involved gunfire and theft of a gun later linked to a 2006 Exxon burglary.
- A separate August 17, 2007 robbery/home invasion and murder of Charmeka Harris occurred; Horton was found by the district court to be involved in the robbery and murder.
- The Probation Office and district court treated the Harris murder as relevant conduct to enhance Horton’s offense level under USSG § 2K2.1, using the murder guideline 2A1.1 for a cross-reference.
- Horton appealed challenges to substitution of counsel and to denial of a new trial on Brady grounds; the Fourth Circuit rejected those challenges as harmless or unfounded.
- The pivotal sentencing issue was whether the district court properly applied the murder cross-reference, which the panel vacated and remanded for resentencing without applying the cross-reference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the substitute-counsel denial an abuse of discretion? | Horton argued the court abused its discretion in denying substitute counsel. | The government contends no reversible error occurred. | Harmless error; conviction affirmed. |
| Was Horton entitled to a new trial based on Brady evidence? | Brady material (the Miller Report) should have been disclosed and could impeach officers. | Disclosure was not legally required or not material to outcome; no Brady violation. | No Brady violation; no new trial. |
| Did the district court properly apply the murder cross-reference under USSG § 2K2.1(c)(l) and Relevant Conduct Guidelines? | Cross-reference applies when both offenses are groupable under the Relevant Conduct Guideline. | Cross-reference should apply because the murder was part of a broader course of conduct tied to the felon-in-possession offense. | Cross-reference misapplied; vacate sentence and remand for resentencing. |
| Was Horton’s August 17 murder properly treated as relevant conduct under the Grouping Guideline (3D1.2) and USSG § 1B1.3? | The murder was groupable with the felon-in-possession offense, making cross-reference appropriate. | Murder offenses are excluded from grouping; cross-reference cannot rely on a non-groupable offense. | Grouping inapplicable; cross-reference cannot be used to enhance the sentence. |
| If cross-reference was improper, should the sentence be vacated or remanded for resentencing with guidance on § 3553(a)? | Remand should address whether Harris murder could support a variance; the base issue is the cross-reference error. | Resentencing should occur with appropriate guidance on 3553(a) factors. | Remand for resentencing; do not apply the murder cross-reference on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2005) (grouping issues with murder cross-reference; approach to groupable offenses)
- United States v. Pauley, 289 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussion of relevance of cross-references and grouping; reliance on § 1B1.3(a)(2))
- United States v. Jones, 313 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 2002) (cross-reference and grouping considerations; homicide exclusion from grouping)
- United States v. Kulick, 629 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2010) (touches on cross-reference application and grouping limitations)
- United States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2010) (relevant conduct framework and appellate review standards)
- United States v. Levario-Quiroz, 161 F.3d 903 (5th Cir. 1998) (relevant conduct scope and grouping considerations)
- United States v. Settle, 414 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005) (grouping and cross-reference discussion in cross-reference context)
- United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 772 (11th Cir. 2005) (any firearm interpretation in cross-reference context)
- United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2012) (remand and sentencing considerations; harmless-error discussions)
- Bell v. United States, 5 F.3d 64 (4th Cir. 1993) (district court authority on remand and resentence)
