United States v. Thorne, ACM 39133

Appellant’s case was docketed with the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals 33 days after the convening authority took final action — exceeding the 30‑day Moreno benchmark and creating a presumption of unreasonable post‑trial delay.
Appellant did not raise post‑trial delay on appeal and claimed no legally cognizable prejudice from any delay.
The court conducted a due‑process review applying Barker v. Wingo and considered whether delay harmed public perception of military justice under Toohey.
The court also considered whether to grant relief under Article 66(c) UCMJ, guided by Tardif and the multi‑factor test articulated in Gay, including institutional neglect and meaningfulness of relief.
The court found the delay minimal, identified no bad faith or gross indifference, found no prejudice or adverse public‑perception effect, and concluded no due‑process violation.
After weighing Gay/Tardif factors and Dunbar’s admonition about administrative delay, the court declined to grant Article 66(c) relief and affirmed the approved findings and sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 33‑day post‑trial delay violated Appellant's due‑process rights	Appellant argued no legally cognizable prejudice (did not press delay issue)	Government implicitly argued delay was minimal, no bad faith, and no prejudice	No due‑process violation; delay did not impair fairness or public perception
Whether appellate relief under Article 66(c) (Tardif/Gay factors) is warranted for the delay	Appellant sought no specific relief and claimed no harm	Government argued no basis for relief given minimal delay and lack of prejudice	Court exercised discretion and denied Article 66(c) relief; affirmed findings and sentence

United States v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (establishes presumptive unreasonableness where post‑trial docketing exceeds 30 days)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four‑factor due‑process test for speedy‑trial/delay claims)
United States v. Toohey, 63 M.J. 353 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (public‑perception consideration in post‑trial delay analysis)
United States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (standard for providing sentence relief for post‑trial delay)
United States v. Gay, 74 M.J. 736 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (multi‑factor guidance for Article 66(c) relief; aff’d)
United States v. Dunbar, 31 M.J. 70 (C.M.A. 1990) (administrative forwarding delay is the least defensible post‑trial delay)