United States v. Thorne, 4:18-cr-00029

Defendant Monte Thorne indicted for large-quantity cocaine distribution, a § 924(c) firearms charge, and felon-in-possession; moved to suppress evidence seized from his home.
Police traced a reported stolen iPhone using Apple’s Find My iPhone to 1621 Cherry Street; officers Wendt and Hathaway went to the address after another officer contacted them.
Hathaway told Thorne they could either consent to a search for the phone or the police would obtain a search warrant; Thorne initially resisted but then invited officers inside to look for the phone.
While searching for the phone, Hathaway observed digital scales and a white powdery substance in plain view; subsequent questioning yielded admissions and a warrant was obtained, after which officers seized ~650 grams of cocaine.
Magistrate judge recommended denial of suppression; district court reviewed de novo the voluntariness issue and held Thorne’s consent was voluntary and not coerced, and that no Miranda violation occurred.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Voluntariness of consent to search	Consent was voluntary given brief, uncoercive encounter and limited officer presence	Consent was coerced by officers’ statements about obtaining a warrant	Consent was voluntary under totality of circumstances; suppression denied
Scope of search / plain view	Search was limited to phone; discovery of contraband in plain view during that limited search is lawful	Officers exceeded the announced scope; Hathaway’s statement that he wasn’t interested in other items was pretextual	Items observed in plain view during a search for the phone did not exceed the scope; discovery lawful
Effect of officer’s warrant-threat statement	Telling occupant they could consent or officers would get a warrant is not coercive if officers had probable cause	Statement amounted to coercion like asserting a warrant exists and vitiated consent	Not coercive here because officers had probable cause to seek a warrant based on Find My iPhone and surrounding facts
Miranda / custodial interrogation	Statements to officers were voluntary and non-custodial	Statements were pre-Miranda custodial interrogation and should be suppressed	Court found no custodial interrogation and did not suppress the statements

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (voluntariness of consent judged from totality of circumstances)
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (Fourth Amendment protection for reasonable expectations of privacy)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (probable cause is a "fair probability" inquiry)
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (consent coerced where officer falsely asserts presence of warrant)
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (scope of consent search defined by expressed object)
Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (court will rely on reasonable, practical inferences in probable-cause analysis)
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (GPS/location-tracking technology and Fourth Amendment considerations)
United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647 (consent voluntariness factors; Fourth Cir. en banc guidance)
United States v. Saafir, 754 F.3d 262 (false assertions of probable cause vitiate consent)
United States v. Aguebor, 166 F.3d 1210 (advising a suspect a warrant will be sought is not coercive when officers have probable cause)