United States v. Thompson
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21518
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- Thompson pled guilty (2015) to possession with intent to distribute marijuana and being a felon in possession of a firearm; district court applied an enhanced sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 based on a prior North Carolina conviction for assault inflicting serious bodily injury (AISBI).
- The probation officer treated AISBI as a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2; Thompson objected and preserved the issue on appeal.
- The district court rejected Thompson’s challenge and imposed an enhanced 120-month sentence (with downward variance adjustments still applied).
- The Fourth Circuit stayed the appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles (addressing vagueness of the Guidelines’ residual clause); after Beckles, the parties rebriefed the applicability of § 4B1.2’s residual clause.
- The central legal question: whether AISBI qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, applying the categorical/"ordinary case" approach and Begay/James/Johnson framework.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether AISBI is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 residual clause | Thompson: AISBI may be committed with negligence; not "similar in kind" to enumerated offenses | Gov: AISBI ordinarily involves intentional, violent conduct comparable to enumerated offenses | Court: AISBI qualifies under the residual clause — ordinary AISBI involves purposeful, violent, aggressive conduct |
| Whether the Begay "similar-in-kind" test remains controlling after Johnson | Thompson: Begay analysis still applies and shows AISBI fails because statute permits negligent violations | Gov: Johnson does not eliminate Begay; AISBI’s ordinary case shows intentional conduct | Court: Begay remains applicable; Johnson requires assessing the "ordinary case" for both degree-of-risk and similar-in-kind inquiries |
| Whether to use categorical or modified categorical approach | Thompson: (argues generally for categorical limits) | Gov: Statutory elements and North Carolina caselaw show ordinary AISBI is intentional; statute not divisible so categorical approach governs | Court: Applied the categorical approach; statute not divisible, and North Carolina precedent shows ordinary AISBI is intentional |
| Whether Johnson voided § 4B1.2 residual clause as unconstitutionally vague | Thompson: relied on post-Johnson uncertainty | Gov: Beckles controls for Guidelines vagueness challenge; residual clause remains assessable | Court: Beckles forecloses vagueness challenge to the Guidelines; thus the court applies the residual clause analysis and affirms |
Key Cases Cited
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (Guidelines not subject to vagueness challenge)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause void for vagueness; clarifies ordinary-case inquiry)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (residual clause covers offenses similar in kind to enumerated crimes)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (use of enumerated offenses as baseline for degree-of-risk analysis)
- United States v. Martin, 753 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying Begay/James to hold some offenses not similar in kind)
- United States v. White, 571 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 2009) (degree-of-risk analysis for residual clause)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach for predicate offenses)