United States v. Thompson
633 F. App'x 534
2d Cir.2015Background
- Defendants Michael Thompson and Tylon Vaughn were convicted after a joint jury trial of narcotics conspiracy and related distribution counts; sentences were imposed by the District of Connecticut.
- Thompson moved to suppress evidence seized from his apartment, contending his consent was involuntary; the district court found consent voluntary based on officer statements and a written consent form.
- Both defendants challenged wiretap interceptions (Title III); one challenged recording (session 4111) captured 20 seconds of a non-target phone’s background before the target answered. The government did not introduce that 20-second segment at trial.
- Thompson objected to admission of officers’ field-test testimony (presumptive tests for cocaine/crack) and sought to broaden cross-examination of cooperating witness Christopher Morley (including unsealing Morley’s IFP financial affidavit).
- Both defendants raised sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims; Thompson specifically contested the jury’s finding that five kilograms of cocaine was reasonably foreseeable to him (quantity element for § 841(b)(1)(A)). The Second Circuit found insufficient evidence to support the 5 kg cocaine quantity as to Thompson and remanded for resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(C); all other convictions and rulings were affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (U.S.) | Defendant's Argument (Thompson / Vaughn) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntariness of consent to search apartment | Officer’s statement that a warrant could be sought and others could be arrested did not coerce consent; totality supports voluntariness | Rivera’s statement coerced consent (threat to arrest sister/girlfriend); consent involuntary | Affirmed: court found consent voluntary; advising that a warrant could be obtained is not coercive per precedent |
| Title III interceptions (session 4111 / roving wiretap claim) | Any incidental capture was lawful; challenged segment not used at trial; no pattern of roving interceptions | Session 4111 was an unauthorized recording of a non-target phone and suggests a roving bug | Affirmed as harmless/error not reached: challenged 20-second segment not admitted and no showing it led to other suppressed evidence; roving-wiretap claim lacked other instances |
| Admissibility of field-test testimony for drugs | Field-test and lay/circumstantial testimony sufficient to identify drugs without lab analysis | Field-tests are only presumptive and not proof beyond a reasonable doubt; inadmissible | Affirmed: lay testimony and presumptive tests are permissible circumstantial evidence to identify controlled substances |
| Sufficiency as to cocaine quantity (5 kg) for Thompson | Evidence of relationship with cooperator and some shared dealings supported foreseeability of large quantities | No evidence tying Thompson to >5 kg; only ~2 kg sold to/received from Morley and a few hundred grams — five kilograms not reasonably foreseeable | Reversed as to quantity: insufficient evidence to sustain 5 kg finding; remanded for resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(C); remainder of convictions affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (Voluntariness of consent determined by totality of circumstances)
- United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir.) (Advising that a warrant can be obtained is not coercion)
- Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (Trial judges may limit cross-examination within Confrontation Clause bounds)
- United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438 (2d Cir.) (Lay/circumstantial evidence may suffice to identify controlled substances)
- United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346 (2d Cir.) (Physical appearance and observed effects support drug identification absent lab reports)
- United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55 (2d Cir.) (Foreseeability of conspiracy-wide drug quantity requires evidentiary link to defendant)
- United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130 (2d Cir.) (Standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
- United States v. Gonzalez, 686 F.3d 122 (2d Cir.) (Procedure for resentencing when indictment fails to charge a specific quantity)