United States v. Thompson
431 F. App'x 2
1st Cir.2011Background
- Thompson was federally convicted in 2001 of possession of child pornography and separately in Maine for gross sexual assault and sexual abuse; he began probation in December 2006 and registered as a sex offender under federal and Maine law.
- In 2007-2008 authorities learned he violated probation and could not be located at his registered address; his whereabouts remained unknown until February 2008 when he registered a motor vehicle in New Mexico.
- A federal grand jury in the District of Maine indicted Thompson for a single count of failing to register as a sex offender under SORNA (18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)).
- Thompson moved to dismiss on constitutional grounds; the district court denied the motion, and he entered a conditional guilty plea reserving appellate rights.
- The district court sentenced Thompson to 37 months; on appeal, the First Circuit reviews de novo because the claims are constitutional in nature.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Due process: pre-SORNA enactment states' implementation | Thompson contends no registration obligation existed where states had not enacted SORNA implementations. | Thompson argues lack of notice and absence of state implementation at relevant times negate mens rea or knowledge. | Due process not violated; registration requirements apply independently of state implementation. |
| Necessity of specific intent for § 2250(a) | Thompson asserts proof of specific intent to flout SORNA was required. | Thompson asserts only a general intent to fail to register was needed. | Conviction sustained; knowledge/intent standard does not require specific intent. |
| Commerce Clause authority to enact SORNA | Thompson contends Congress lacked power to regulate under Commerce Clause. | Thompson maintains constitutional limits on Congress's power are violated. | SORNA upheld against Commerce Clause challenges. |
| Ex Post Facto challenges from pre-SORNA conviction used to ground indictment | Thompson claims retroactive use of pre-SORNA conduct violates Ex Post Facto. | Thompson argues retroactivity of statute creates a penal adjustment. | No Ex Post Facto violation; new acts formed elements of the offense. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. DiTomasso, 621 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2010) (SORNA registration not conditioned on state implementation)
- United States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ex post facto and retroactivity analysis in federal context)
- United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008) (Ex post facto considerations in federal criminal law)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 630 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2010) (federal law governs ex post facto analysis in federal cases)
- United States v. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007) (principles for evaluating constitutional challenges to federal statutes)
- State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4 (Me. 2009) (state retroactivity analysis; Maine statute context discussed)