United States v. Thomas S. Jackson
688 F. App'x 685
11th Cir.2017Background
- Thomas Jackson was Chief of Police in Longwood, FL (1997–May 2010) and had authority to appoint officers; he accepted multiple payments from Samer Majzoub while facilitating Majzoub’s representation as an LPD law‑enforcement officer.
- Majzoub had a prior federal felony conviction and a gubernatorial pardon; Florida Commission certification was required to serve as a Florida law‑enforcement officer, and FDLE staff concluded Majzoub was not eligible to be certified.
- Jackson gave Majzoub LPD credentials (badges, ID cards, business cards), swore him in, arranged firearms qualification (including a forged qualification sheet), and wrote letters recommending Majzoub to other agencies.
- Majzoub made at least six payments to Jackson (three were the basis for the indictment). Jackson used some funds in connection with a proposed North Carolina property purchase. Jackson’s financial records showed chronic cash shortfalls.
- A jury convicted Jackson of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371) and three counts of federal‑funds bribery (18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B)); the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, requested jury instruction on Florida law, certain evidentiary rulings, and indictment dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for § 666(a)(1)(B) bribery | Government: Jackson accepted payments corruptly to appoint/promote Majzoub and performed covered transactions (appointing, swearing in, issuing credentials). | Jackson: Payments were not corrupt bribes; some payments occurred after acts and Majzoub may have been eligible under Florida law — so no corrupt intent or covered act. | Affirmed: Evidence sufficient to show Jackson corruptly accepted value intending to be influenced/rewarded in connection with LPD transactions; rewards for past acts fall within § 666(a)(1)(B). |
| Requirement of an “official act” / quid pro quo under § 666 | Government: § 666 does not require an “official act” or explicit quid pro quo; corrupt intent to be influenced or rewarded suffices. | Jackson: Relies on later bribery doctrines (e.g., McDonnell) to argue § 666 should require an official act or quid pro quo. | Affirmed: Circuit precedent (McNair) controls; § 666’s text covers corrupt intent to be influenced/rewarded without requiring McDonnell‑style official‑act. |
| Requested jury instruction about Florida law (eligibility/certification) | — (n/a) | Jackson: Jury should be instructed about Florida law (Sandlin and related authority) showing felon with pardon may be certifiable — undermining corrupt intent or illegality. | Affirmed: District court properly refused; Florida certification law was irrelevant to whether Jackson corruptly appointed Majzoub without Commission certification and gave him indicia of office. |
| Sufficiency for conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371) | Government: Payments, communications, overt acts (swearing in, firearms qualification, forged documents, property‑deal emails) establish agreement, knowing participation, and overt acts. | Jackson: Contends lack of illegal objective or intent undermines conspiracy. | Affirmed: Evidence supported conspiracy to commit bribery and related acts; overt acts proved. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010) (§ 666 requires corrupt intent to be influenced or rewarded; no official‑act requirement)
- United States v. White, 663 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2011) (defining corrupt intent under § 666)
- United States v. US Infrastructure, Inc., 576 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2009) (payments must be with corrupt intent to influence or reward)
- United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 1995) (§ 666 covers payments intended to reward past official conduct)
- United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013) (distinguishing gratuities for past acts from bribes under a different statute)
- Sun‑Diamond Growers of California v. United States, 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (interpretation of a different bribery statute — discussed but not applied)
- McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (Supreme Court’s official‑act definition under § 201; discussed regarding its inapplicability to § 666)