United States v. Thomas Krebs, 830 F.3d 800

Thomas Eugene Krebs pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
Krebs had a 1982 Iowa conviction for indecent contact with a child under Iowa Code § 709.12(1) (1981).
Under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, parties agreed to 120 months’ imprisonment if the prior conviction triggered § 2252(b)(2)’s ten-year mandatory minimum; otherwise they agreed to 60 months and 240 months supervised release.
The district court found Krebs’s indecent-contact conviction qualified as a prior conviction “relating to…sexual abuse” under § 2252(b)(2) and imposed the 120-month mandatory term over Krebs’s objection.
Krebs argued the Chapter 109A definitions of aggravated sexual abuse/sexual abuse/abusive sexual conduct do not apply and, alternatively, that his Iowa conviction did not meet the ordinary meaning of those terms; he also invoked the rule of lenity.
The court affirmed, concluding prior Eighth Circuit precedent controls, the Iowa offense involved touching for sexual gratification, and lenity does not apply.

Issue	Krebs's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Krebs’s Iowa indecent-contact conviction qualifies as a § 2252(b)(2) predicate	Conviction does not fit definitions of “aggravated sexual abuse,” “sexual abuse,” or “abusive sexual conduct”	The prior conviction involves sexual contact with a minor for sexual gratification and thus qualifies	The conviction qualifies as a predicate under § 2252(b)(2)
Whether Chapter 109A definitions control interpretation of § 2252(b)(2)	Chapter 109A definitions should govern meaning of terms in § 2252(b)(2)	Eighth Circuit precedent holds Chapter 109A definitions do not apply to § 2252(b)	Chapter 109A definitions do not govern § 2252(b)(2); Sonnenberg controls
Whether the Iowa statute is divisible and charging document may be consulted to identify the offense of conviction	Charging document cannot be used to establish a qualifying offense if statutory elements are broader	The statute is divisible; the charging document shows conviction for touching intimate parts to arouse sexual desire	The court treated the statute as divisible and relied on the information to identify the convicted conduct
Whether ambiguity in statutory terms requires applying the rule of lenity in Krebs’s favor	Terms are ambiguous and lenity should resolve against enhancement	Prior Eighth Circuit law rejects lenity here	Lenity does not apply; Sonnenberg forecloses that argument

United States v. Sonnenberg, 556 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2009) (Chapter 109A definitions do not control § 2252(b) and ordinary meaning of “sexual abuse of a minor” includes misuse for sexual gratification)
Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016) (interpreting scope of state convictions that can trigger federal enhancements; took no position on the precise meanings of “aggravated sexual abuse,” “sexual abuse,” and “abusive sexual conduct”)
United States v. Cover, 703 F.3d 477 (8th Cir. 2013) (addresses interpretation of predicate-offense enhancements under § 2252(b))