United States v. Thomas Hidalgo, 711 F. App'x 819

Hidalgo was indicted on two counts of distributing a controlled substance and remained at large for ~23 months between indictment and arrest.
He moved to dismiss the indictment for violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right and Rule 48(b); the district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion.
Hidalgo entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment; he appealed both the denial of dismissal and his sentence.
The government conducted sustained, targeted efforts to locate Hidalgo (surveillance at multiple addresses, NCIC warrant entry, LAPD assistance, internet/social-media searches, arrest at LAX after tip), and the court found reasonable diligence.
Hidalgo argued the delay prejudiced his defense (lost witnesses, faded memories, lost evidence) and that a 2009 uncounseled DUI misdemeanor should not count in his federal criminal-history calculation because his waiver of counsel and need for a Spanish interpreter rendered that conviction unconstitutional.
The district court found: Barker factors did not warrant dismissal; state-court waiver form and defendant’s sophistication supported a valid waiver; conviction presumptively regular; even if error, inclusion was harmless because Hidalgo received the statutory mandatory minimum and was ineligible for safety-valve relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sixth Amendment speedy-trial / Rule 48(b) dismissal for 23-month post-indictment delay	Delay was presumptively prejudicial and, together with government fault and prejudice, warrants dismissal	Government exercised reasonable diligence locating Hidalgo; defendant sought continuances and failed to show specific prejudice	Affirmed: Barker factors weighed against dismissal — government diligence, delay not attributable to serious prosecutorial bad faith, defendant did not show specific prejudice
Inclusion of uncounseled 2009 DUI misdemeanor in federal criminal-history computation	DUI conviction unconstitutional (invalid waiver of counsel; lack of Spanish interpreter) so it should not count toward criminal history	State-court waiver form and defendant’s education/sophistication support valid waiver; conviction entitled to presumption of regularity; inclusion harmless in any event	Affirmed: district court properly credited the conviction and, alternatively, any error was harmless because defendant received the mandatory minimum sentence and lacked safety-valve eligibility

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (long post-indictment delay is presumptively prejudicial and triggers Barker inquiry)
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (valid waiver of counsel depends on facts, defendant’s sophistication, and charge complexity)
United States v. Dominguez, 316 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2003) (presumption of regularity for state convictions used in federal sentencing)
United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2003) (standard of review for constitutional rulings and factual findings)
United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (assessment of government diligence in locating a defendant)
United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2007) (weight of defendant’s assertion of speedy-trial right when preceded by continuances)
United States v. Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2007) (review of district court factual finding on safety-valve eligibility is for clear error)